

Celebrity Engagement in Politics: A Study on South Asian Perspective

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Abstract: *This study intends to explore the causal-effect relationship of celebrity engagement in South Asian politics. This study is important because celebrities' engagement in politics has brought about a change in political communication where one can be a politician within very short time without having any political background and even more a conventional politician can be defeated in election by celebrities- turned- politician. Celebrities engage themselves in politics or politicians endorse celebrities' 'celebrity- hood' in politics in order to get more political benefits. This study on celebrity engagement in politics derives three actors as the voters; the conventional politicians; and popular culture and sports celebrities. South Asia is rich with diversity in every aspect of its political arena and celebrities are treated here as Ferestha (meaning of the word is 'angel' in Islam). In most of the South Asian countries, celebrities are being worshipped like idols to people. People follow celebrities in their daily activities, sometimes gossip in their working time and even wait for them to see at a glance. Political parties use this all-acceptance figure of the celebrities to gain popular support from the voters. This study is analytical in nature and based on secondary sources of data. Source credibility and meaning transfer theory are applied as theoretical tools for this study.*

Keywords: *causal-effect, engagement, celebrity-hood, conventional politician, all-acceptance figure, popular support.*

Introduction

In 2016 US Presidential Election, business and media celebrity Donald Trump defeated Hillary Rodham Clinton who is more politically experienced and worked as two important officials- First Lady of Bill Clinton regime (1993- 2001) and Secretary of the State of Barack Obama's first regime (2009- 2013). It proves that, without having any political background a sportsman or popular media celebrity can shine in politics. Furthermore, when we heard the name of Steven Spielberg, our mind immediately answers he is the famous Hollywood filmmaker of science-fiction and adventurous film such as Jurassic Park, Indiana Jones series, Transformers etc. His popularity might have a dark shadow on his recent donation of \$1 million to relief efforts in Israel. A person may regard Israel carnage as against humanity but as a fan of Steven Spielberg, his feeling against Israel Carnage may obtuse. Thus, celebrities' involvement in any issue controls the mind of general people and makes them thickheaded to consider impartially. Celebrity engagement in politics is a mind control trick of politicians for winning election or gaining the support for the candidates nominated in the election (Wheeler, 2013). There are many world-famous politicians whose early careers were non-political and later they turned themselves

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as politicians and got successful. Ronald Reagan was a product of Hollywood, later he turned himself as politician as well as became 40th US President and other prominent entertainers-turned-politicians in the United States have included Sonny Bono, Shirley Temple, Eastwood, Fred Grandy, Fred Thompson (Strate in IB Times, 2012).

The word 'celebrity' refers to those people who, via mass media, enjoy 'a greater presence and wider scope of activities and agency than are those who make up the rest of the population (Street, 2004, p. 437). They are allowed to move on the public stage while the rest of us watch. (Marshall, 1997, p. ix). There are two phenomena regarding celebrity engagement in politics i.e. celebrity politician and politicized celebrity (Street, 2004, p. 437). This general definition covers a wide variety of public figures. There are some political leaders who enjoy celebrity-hood around the world. Their attitude, choices and pattern of life are followed by the masses strongly. On the other hand, politicized celebrity denotes about those celebrities whose background is in entertaining world, show businesses or sports and who trades on this background (by virtue of the skills acquired, the popularity achieved, or the images associated) in the attempt to get elected (Turner, 2004). Example of this would include Ronald Regan, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Jayalalita and so on.

In a star-struck country like India, it is almost a norm to see actors, sportsmen, singers and the others belonging to the celebrity tribe using their 'charm offensive' to make a place in politics. From Olympics medal-winner Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore to former runners-up of Miss India (Smiriti Irani), the spectrum of celebrities who have joined politics is quite large. While some celebrities made it big in politics, the track record of the majority is dismal. Former cricketer Imran Khan has become founder chairperson of a political party named Tehreek-e-Insaf in Pakistan; Mamtaj from Bangladesh and Anarkali Akarsha from Sri Lanka and Dev from India became members of legislative assembly in their respective countries; Bollywood superstar Gavinda was a Member of Parliament (MP) of Lok Shabha since 2004 to 2009. People's fascination with celebrities has somewhat overshadowed the power of reasoning and they tend to ignore the non-performing factors. Movie and television stars, acknowledging the need to connect with their audiences on multiple levels, take it upon themselves or possibly they are advised to become representatives of what they perceive to be issues of interest to the public (Meyer & Gamson, 1995). Since politicians now compete with these new forms of affiliation and expression, they are challenged to appeal to an electorate whose ideals are no longer expressed in communal forms of association, but more significantly aligned along patterns of consumption. These dynamics, it has been argued, can be symptomatic of current transformations in the practice of formal representative democracy, which is being challenged by 'a discursive form of political activism in which solidarity exists but is not tied to any notion of the common good or a particular ideology' (Wheeler, 2013, p. 15). Besides media celebrities, sports celebrities are too prayed in politics. In particular, many of the South Asian countries' top players have shown success in politics. None of these players have political background but their popularity come as beneficiary in politics. Hence, the question may arise- 'does the popularity or acceptance of celebrities enough to participate in politics?'

To find out the answer of this question, this study explores how the popularity of celebrities have been used in South Asian politics, why celebrities are interested to participate, why the voters vote for them and how their performances and contribution in politics are evaluated. The study shows that different ideologies based political parties have accommodated popular culture and sports celebrities in order to get people's support to win elections. Celebrities engage themselves to acquire more power and wish to contribute to social and political issues. Voters cast votes in favor of the celebrities because they (celebrities) are overly familiar to voters with media having an all acceptance image.

Objectives of the Study

The study has been designed to explore the causal effect relationship of celebrity engagement in South Asian politics. The other objectives of the study are as

- to illustrate the actual scenario of celebrity engagement in South Asian politics;
- to identify the facts that guide celebrities to participate in politics and examine their (celebrities') performances and contributions in politics;
- to explore the views of voters towards the engagement of celebrities in politics; and
- to figure out the reasons behind the engagement of celebrities in politics by politicians.

Methodology of the Study

The study is qualitative in nature, but some figures are shown in quantitative way. The paper is analytical in nature which analyzes celebrities' engagement in politics based on (based on what should be thought) that drive celebrities to the path of political affairs like being a candidate in elections and campaigning on behalf of the mainstream politicians in different times in different modes. The study is primarily based on secondary data. Most of the data and information have been collected from published and unpublished research works, relevant books, published articles, survey reports, working papers, journals and internet sources.

Theoretical Framework of the Study

The study is based on some theories related to the voter- candidates' relationship and its impact on the mind set-up of the electorates. The three stakeholders of the study, the voters, the conventional politicians and the celebrities themselves, have been discussed under the following theories.

Source Credibility Model: Have we bothered to question why people prefer one speaker to another? Have we ever experienced listening to a speaker on television and would not want to change the channel even when what he/ she is saying makes little or no sense to us? The reason for the above scenario is source credibility and trustworthiness (Umeogu, 2012). By way of definition, source credibility can be seen as a situation where message believability is dependent on the credibility status of the sender in the minds and eyes of the receivers. Academic studies of the topic are said to have begun in the twentieth century and were given a special emphasis during the World War II when the United

States government thought to use propaganda and mind management to influence public opinions in support of war efforts (Pinkerton, 1994 in Cornan et al., 2006).

The concept of source credibility was developed by Aristotle in a text of his works, called *The Rhetoric*. From the book, it became evident that Aristotle divided the means of persuasion into three categories: ethos, logos and pathos. According to Aristotle, the rhetorician ethos plays the most important role in influencing the audiences' thought and beliefs. It is what makes the speaker in the first place. Such an ethos implies the communicators' knowledge and understanding of the message coupled with moral authority and expressed good-will of the message sender. This is where understanding and perceived expertise comes into play. It is the known contributing factor for the credibility and trust vested in the communicator. Baudhin and Davis (1972) affirms that the communicator's ethos plays an essential role in effectively persuading message receivers (Baudhin & Davis, 1972 in Umeogu, 2012, p. 113- 114). Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) introduced Source Credibility Model to explain the impact of credibility of sources to the beneficiaries. The Source Credibility Model states that people are more likely to be persuaded when the source presents itself as credible. Although it seems obvious that a more credible source would be much more likely to affect the attitudes of others, it also feels that this concept is worthy of study since it is regularly being proven and disproved (Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953).

Relationship between Source Credibility and Politics: There appears to be some acceptance of the belief that the characteristics of a communicator influence an audience's reception of a message. This belief affects not only the use of testimonials for commercial advertising but also the choice of endorsers for political candidates and social causes (Umeogu, 2012, p. 114). Researchers have found that sources having more of the credibility dimensions induce greater attitude change immediately than do sources having less of those dimensions (Dhokolia, 1987). In politics and public administration, credibility and charisma seem to have become a highly sought-after quality and virtue. Political parties seek political support from people by any means and source credibility is about "additional performative qualities that includes things like rhetoric, timing, appropriateness, charisma, eloquence, responsiveness and vision". The source credibility boots candidate's image which is a major determinant in voters' behaviors and candidates' selection. In other words, the success or failure of any political campaign or endeavor depends on how credible the voters perceive the candidate to be. While expertise and trustworthiness affect credibility in advertising, source credibility in politics consists of competence, trustworthiness, and goodwill (Umeogu, 2012).

Meaning Transfer Model: The concept of meaning transfer model is relevant to the context of celebrity endorsements in different purposes. This theory denotes that celebrity meaning(s) could be explained through metaphors and the metaphors may be transferred to a brand from a celebrity endorser via an endorsement. The propositions developed in the study have important implications for researchers and practitioners in celebrity endorsement (Roy, 2016). Celebrities can transfer various meanings to the goods or services and there are without any doubt a large number of meanings comprised in a

celebrity, such as rank, gender, age, way of life, and individuality. This model provides a "conventional path for the movement of cultural meaning in consumer societies" (Erdogan B. Z., 1999, p. 294). The process is composed of mainly three stages: the construction of celebrity image, the movement from celebrity to product and the transfer of meaning from product to consumers (McCracken, 1989 in Schlecht, 2003, p. 7). According to McCracken (1989), in the first stage, meanings come from a culturally comprised world, a physical and social world constituted by many ranks and laws and standard of the existing culture. In this process, there are many artists that play a vital and significant role. Advertising is a kind of bridge of bringing together consumer (voters) wants and needs and the illustration of the culturally composed world. As a consequence, one of the main roles of advertising is to convey the culturally constituted significance or meaning of products to consumers.

The second level is the transfer of meaning from celebrity to product. It is the point where the commodity achieves individuality throughout the process of the transfer of celebrity's meanings. This effort is accomplished by advertising agencies which selects the right celebrity to advertise the product with the correct meanings. Subsequently, the meanings are shifted to the product, they should be shifted to consumers as well (stage 3). According to McCracken, this last transfer is to be completed by the work of the consumers who are ready to take control of the meanings. This development will be accomplished through cultural practice and traditions. The comprehensive idea of this procedure is that first an image is associated with the celebrity. Then their image is shifted to that particular product (i.e. vote campaigning) they are advertising, and beyond any doubt their image accounts a switch in the ways of the product to consumers with the help of use and purchase. Endorsers (politicians) believe that the symbols associated with the celebrities will be associated with their products (support from the voters) and in result be joined to the celebrity for coming citations by the general people.

Conceptual Framework

Who Are Celebrity: The word 'celebrity' refers to those people who, via mass media, enjoy 'a greater presence and wider scope of activity and agency than are those who make up the rest of the population. They can move on the public stage while the rest of us watch' (Marshall, 1997, ix). Celebrity culture has its origins in the 20th century, and it has evolved along with innovations in media and communications technology. It has largely been the influence of television that has blurred the boundaries between entertainment and politics, beginning in the 1960s, and increasing over the past half century (Strate in IB Times, 2012). Schlecht (2003) defines "celebrities are people who enjoy public recognition by a large share of a certain group of people" (Schlecht, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, American presidents, including Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, realized that radio and television could be employed to gain access to the United States public. Alongside this employment of the media by the political classes, the twentieth century saw the rise of the modern celebrity (O'Regan, 2014). Subsequently, as the stars' fame grew, politicians realized the benefits of getting celebrities to endorse their candidacies to appeal to a wider constituency of support. The

most extensive use of celebrities coincided with the ascendancies of the two most media-savvy chief executives, Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, thereby establishing a template for modern endorsements (Wheeler, 2013).

There are two terms regarding celebrity and politics nexus as celebrity politician and politicized celebrity. Mark Wheeler (2013) offers an analysis of the ways that celebrity politicians and politicized celebrities have had an impact upon the practice of politics. New forms of political participation have emerged as a result and the political classes have increasingly absorbed the values of celebrity into their own political strategies. A politician who has gained 'celebrity hood' through his or her political career is called celebrity politician i.e. former president or head of the government of a country can be termed as a celebrity politician. On the other hand, when a media or sports celebrity turns himself or herself into a politician by making his celebrity hood as a tool for winning in political field is called politicized celebrity i.e. Jayalalita in India. A celebrity politician demonstrates an elected politician or a nominated candidate and whose background is in politics. On the other hand, politicized celebrity can be divided into two parts as politicized celebrity (PC1) which refers to an elected politician (or a nominated candidate) whose background is in entertainment, show business or sport, and who trades on this background (by virtue of the skills acquired, the popularity achieved, or the images associated) in the attempt to get elected. Examples of this would include Schwarzenegger, Ronald Reagan. The second kind of politicized celebrity (PC2) which refers to the entertainer who pronounces on politics and claims the right to represent peoples and causes, but who does so without seeking or acquiring elected office. Their engagement tends to take the form of public gestures or statements aimed at changing specific public policy decisions. They are taken seriously in respect of their political views as media focus on their politics and political attention (Street, 2004, p. 438).

Engagement of Celebrities in South Asian Politics

South Asia is basically a politically 'neutral' term which denotes the ideas of ancient greater India (Bose & Jalal, 1997, p. 3). Ancient India is known to the western as a country of 'Raja- Maharajas', snake charmers and rope-trick (Thapar, 1966). In this connection celebrities or famous people are treated very warmly. And now media culture and sport celebrities enjoy a huge celebrity-hood in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. And different political parties intend to capitalize their fame to gain maximum output from politics. In Sri Lanka there are a number of politicians who were not conventional politicians in their early career and later became politicians using their celebrity-hood. Remarkably they are as Vijaya Kumaratunga, Tikiri Bandara Ilangaratne, Ranjan Ramanayake, Arjuna Ranatunga and so on. The mentioned renowned figures of Sri Lanka have served as either cabinet ministers or member of parliaments or other political posts of Sri Lankan government with having any political background. There are also popular culture celebrities and politicians in Pakistan as Imran Khan who is a former cricket champion and after his retirement from Pakistan national cricket team he founded a political party named Tehreek-e-Insaf in 1996. In India it exceeds more than hundreds both in provincial and central politics. There are some

remarkable figures regarding nexus of celebrities and politics as Jayalalita, Amitabh Bacchan, Gabinda, Navojit Singh Sidhu, Mohammad Azharuddin and so on. And in Bangladesh it also demonstrates the engagement of celebrities in political activities and remarkable names are film star Kabori Sarwar, folk singer Mamtaj, former cricketer Naimur Rahman Durjoy and so on.

Now-a-days this is being contradictory to analyze that, whether or not celebrity endorsement in politics actually makes differences in election. In spite of that, it will not be so irrational if saying that, celebrity endorsement in politics makes it easier for voter to differentiate between the candidates. Furthermore, it has been easier for the candidate as a media or sports person to mobilize young citizens' vote. Analysts think that, a new dimension has been added in the world politics due to the participation of politicians and celebrity stars; and contesting election with each other. In South Asian countries this scenario is not so different.

India General Election 2014 was very much influential over general people because of the participation of the politicians with strong political background as well as the candidates with strong media or sports popularity. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) achieved huge victory winning 336 seats. Among these, BJP itself won 282 seats which are 51.9% of total achievement of NDA . Former Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi was chosen to lead Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) . Modi's strategy was to nominate many celebrities for winning this election. For example-

- Modi nominated popular singer Babul Supriyo who works in Bollywood, Bengali and Oriya films. Babul Supriyo managed to win West Bengal constituency Asansol for BJP.
- Shatrughan Sinha is an actor who made all of his opponents and detractors go 'Khamosh' as he comfortably won the Patna Sahib constituency on a BJP ticket.
- Veteran actress Kirron Kher as a BJP candidate not only managed to defeat first timer Gul Panag, an AAP candidate but also four-time Lok Sabha MP and former Railways Minister Pawan Bansal. She won Chandigarh by a huge majority.
- Hema Malini, the yesteryears dream girl, who has had a long-term association with BJP now, won the Mathura constituency with a huge margin.
- Manoj Towari is hugely popular Bhojpuri star and ex Big Boss contestant won the North-East Delhi seat. The BJP managed to bag all seven seats in New Delhi.
- Vinod Khanna who turned as politician from an actor is a big BJP supporter. He managed to ride the Modi wave and secure a seat for himself from Gurudaspur.

Causes of Celebrity Engagement in South Asian Politics

There are various causes behind the celebrity engagement in politics and this engagement process is basically done by three actors as the voters who cast votes; the political parties who endorse celebrities; and the celebrities themselves who participate in political activities. The following causes are discussed respectively from the view- points of the voters, the political parties and the celebrities.

Changes in Public Opinion: Due to the public's lack of trust in political leaders they seek trust in non- conventional political figures like celebrities from popular culture or sports (Martinson, 2012). And this distrust of people towards political leaders cause a large number of celebrity engagement in South Asian politics. Generally, fans feel a strong sense of connection to the celebrities, they admire, feel a sense of relationship and identification with them, and if a celebrity does something that goes against what the fan believes in, it creates dissonance for the fan. So, when a celebrity endorses a candidate that the fan does not favor, it may reduce the negative feeling the fan has towards that candidate, so in that sense celebrity endorsements can be effective, but it is likely to be balanced out by the fan feeling less positive towards the celebrity (Strate in IB Times, 2012).

Credibility: Source credibility model demonstrates that the consumers (here the voters) tend to support those whose source is credible and popular culture and sports celebrities of South Asia are treated as very credible to the voters. They are well known in their respective fields of work and can influence the general voters through their credibility.

The Ability to Connect: General voters are basically attracted by the ability of the celebrities to connect with all stakeholders, including government officials, international organizations and citizens. This ability makes them a trustworthy figure and their stanch for a policy of a political organization helps to seek more support among the voters.

There are some remarkable causes behind the endorsements of celebrities in political activities and particularly in election campaigning. Even now many celebrities are nominated for election in both central and provincial legislative assembly. So, what are the causes for which political parties nominate celebrities despite having conventional political leaders on those constituencies? The following causes try to find out to answer the question.

Mobilize Young Citizen's Vote: Traditionally, youth are hardly interested and fascinated towards political processes. They often consider voting as just waste of time (Page, 2015). This is another reason that candidates look for celebrity endorsements which may help mobilize young citizens. Identification is a major component of the persuasion process in which celebrities as politicians influence audience behavior- that is the support of general people. Now most South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) enjoy an exclusive dividend of demography which is known as demographic dividend. Most of these countries are young population who are extreme supporters of popular culture and sports celebrities. Different political parties use this support for further political purposes.

Using Celebrities' Image: Celebrities have a tremendous influence over people's lives and when people dislike a celebrity who has contributed to a party and people like that party less. It shows that celebrities' political activities inform how people view them; such that those who dislike a party are turned off a celebrity who they are told has supported that party. Political parties intend to capitalize the image of celebrities and invest this image in order to get more political benefit in the long run (Nownes, 2014). In South Asia, political parties understand the norms of people and invest this 'celebrity-hood' in

political arena. World cup champion former Pakistani cricketer Imran Khan has formed a political party in 1996 and formation of a political party by a cricketer was a big challenge. But later this party got acceptance by people of Pakistan through different anti-governments movements (Shams, 2016).

Low Information Rationality: The reason for why politicians want to engage celebrities in politics because citizens can be easily convinced by the short-cut information gathered from the candidate's non-political life. Celebrities are more liked and admired by the common people. As it has been said before that, celebrities are worshipped as well as considered as an icon by the people, so their popularity become as beneficiary to easily capture the vote. Celebrity endorsement in politics makes political choices easier for the voters to distinguish among the candidates with strong political background and the celebrity candidates with public popularity.

Relationship of Exchange: Jennifer Brubaker suggested that politicians and celebrities offer each other something that they individually lack. Politicians or elected officials have credibility, but are often not liked by the general people; and celebrities are popular and admired, but hardly have credibility or respectability to their names. In that situation when a celebrity become politician it makes comparatively easier for him to win the vote as he already accepted by the general people. In the mind of audience, celebrities are someone better than what they actually are. In opposite, politicians are not easily accepted but when they interact with the faces of media or sports, it helps to humanize them. Brubaker points out that "while the endorsement may not translate directly into votes, the money they raise should translate into support" (Brubaker, 2011).

The next actor of this study is the celebrities themselves and why celebrities engage themselves. The causes may look in the following way-

Contributing to the Welfare of the Masses: Participating in policy making process a politician can contribute the best for the betterment of the masses. The celebrities join politics to contribute to policy making with a greater extent and South Asian countries face a lots of socio economic problems where a celebrity can feel the extensity of the problems and contribute to solve the problems politically.

Participation in Policy Making: Celebrities enjoy much popularity in their life and this popularity makes them accountable to do betterment of his or her society. Political participation can accelerate the process of welfare of the masses. Popular media culture celebrity can feel the truest meaning of life because of acting in different characters throughout their career.

Arguments against Celebrity Engagement in Politics

There are many arguments which suggest that celebrities should stay out of politics. No celebrity should get involved with politics because if celebrities do so it would be quite chaotic because most youths would follow in step with them instead of using their (youth) own common sense. Celebrities should stay to do what they are supposed to do sing, act and just look pretty. Like MP's, they handle the politics (Mark Wahlberg with Olivia,

2016). It is dangerous that celebrities are too influential, especially in a society dominated by social media. People are increasingly reposting celebrity views on political issues as if they have genuine weight, and these rapidly garner support to the point where celebrity opinion replaces the facts on the issue. Celebrities are often out of touch with real social issues and just generalize on charities target audiences instead of just researching social issues on the ground level as opposed to the bird's eye view. Actors are reckless and mentally unstable look at most child stars gone wrong. Who knows what weird views they possess? Far worst than any normal bad politician cause at least the status quo had education and experience in the real world. If the actors enter the political arena we would be back in the days of Emperor Nero and all he will would break loose. Celebrities should keep quiet they do not know what it is like for a struggling middle class or raise a family as a single parent and work. To be honest, celebrities try to get into politics to get a name for themselves. Instead of really focusing on the citizens of a country, they make the economy or the state bad. They can't relate to regular society anymore, so they should have no say in politics because it doesn't affect their pretentious well-paid asses. Celebrities should keep it to themselves because they don't know what it is like to be in the struggling middle class. They are so wealthy, all they care about social issues. It is not fair that all these major celebrities gain tons of votes for their favorite candidate, just because people will do what they do (O'Regan, 2014).

Conclusion

Celebrity engagement in politics has brought about alternative forms of political engagement which indicates cultural changes in the concepts of political participation and communication. It has become a common scenario in South Asian politics because celebrities are treated here with high acceptance without considering their political experiences or ideologies. Political parties endorse celebrities' image to occupy the electoral sentiment of people and study shows that political parties' purposes are achieved. Celebrities also consider the parties' political ideologies in which they are going to join and wishing to work for. So there appears an exchange relationship between political parties and celebrities because celebrities wish to be politician and contribute to the policy making process. Undoubtedly, some of the activities of celebrity- turned-politicians and activists have been problematic. Emotional decisions have come out from these figures and many arguments have been drawn up against celebrity engagement in politics, but this paradigm has contributed a lot to social changes in South Asia.

Though democratically a celebrity can join in politics without having political background, but it is matter of concern that how much democratic values are followed to engage celebrities in politics. As a star stuck region South Asian politics faces some challenges regarding celebrity engagement in politics. If people see a name of celebrity in their ballot paper then they tend to be persuaded without considering the other candidate's background. Yet for celebrity politics to have a democratic worth, it must enhance civic virtues through the mechanisms of input and agency, as much as providing openings for voice and output. Therefore, celebrity politicians and politicized celebrities need to demonstrate ideological substance and provide clarity in establishing a fixed range of

meanings through which people may achieve a real sense of connection with political causes. Consequently, such forms of activity should provide the basis for citizens to act in terms of their own political efficacy to define a wider sense of the common good.

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Inferiority Complex, Anxiety, and Self-esteem of Madrasa Students

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***Abstract:** The aim of this research was to provide an overview of the inferiority complex, anxiety, and self-esteem of the Madrasa students. For achieving this goal, adapted Bangla version scales were administered individually to 950 students. The findings revealed that the inferiority complex and self-esteem were observed poor among the students, but anxiety level was high. The Chi-Square Tests and Multiple Regressions proved that male students possessed lower inferiority complex than their counterparts, but interestingly the higher socioeconomic status of students possessed higher inferiority complex than the middle or lower. There was no significant difference in self-esteem according to gender and residence, but lower socioeconomic status possessed lower self-esteem. Self-esteem and inferiority complex (-.48) were negatively correlated, but anxiety level and inferiority complex was positively correlated (.45). The findings have important implications for policy-making and action, suggesting that the Madrasa education is in need of special care for the welfare of the nation.*

Introduction

Madrasas are religious schools that offer religious education along with secular subjects. In Bangladesh, there are two types of madrasas - Aliya and Qoumi. The Aliya madrasas receive financial support from the government and Qoumi madrasas do not receive any financial support from the government. The curriculum of the Aliya madrasas has a mix of general education and religious subjects. But there is no uniform curriculum in the latter type of madrasas although the weight is heavily on religious subjects. Until 2010 madrasa education was considered outside of the mainstream education system. The new National Education Policy 2010 announced a unified system of education under which Aliya Madrasa, though not Qoumi, students will study the same curriculum and set the examinations as general education students plus they will have their unique religious subjects and separate examinations for the religious subject. When feelings of inferiority are intensified in the individual through discouragement or failure then it turns to inferiority complex (Rajeshwari, 2012). Those who are at risk for developing a complex include people who show signs of low self-esteem or self-worth, are of different ethnicity, have low socioeconomic status, or have a history of depressive symptoms (Gilbert et al., 2007). Many times there are warning signs of someone who may be prone to developing an inferiority complex. When an inferiority complex is in full effect, it may impact the performance of the individual as well as the individual's anxiety level and self-esteem. Self-esteem is an essential human need that is important for healthy development and even survival. It arises automatically from within based on a person's beliefs and consciousness and it occurs in conjunction with a person's behaviors, thoughts, feelings, and actions (Broakover et al., 1978). Those who have low self-esteem feel different inferiority complexity in their life (Gecas & Selff, 1990). Inferiority feeling had a

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negative correlation with self-esteem (Kosaka, 2008; Schlenker, Weingold, & Hallam, 1990). Mumtaz (2008) states that the inferiority complex is a problem of deep-seated, emotionally toned ideas about one's self, psychology considers that it can be eliminated or minimized only by understanding how it originated, why it persists, and then compensating for the inferiority by developing other abilities. Blascovich and Tomaka (1991) reported a link between low self-esteem, anxiety, and depression and suggested that this ultimately impacts upon an individual's social performance. Extensive research has demonstrated that individuals with high self-esteem have more positive, clearer views about themselves than those with low self-esteem (Adriana, 2004). Coopersmith (1967) and Eilsinger and Anderson (1982) stated the negative link between social anxiety and self-esteem. Moritz et al. (2006) reported from research that low self-esteem can have a negative impact on individuals learning and ability to succeed. Cross-sectional studies have reported the strong correlation between self-esteem and anxiety (McMullin & Cairney, 2004; Jonsson, 2000; Brockner & Hess, 1986).

Rationale of the Research: Madrasa is one of the most important institutions of the education system in Bangladesh. The Madrasa education system mainly focuses on religious education. In general, students attending Madrasas compared to those students attending general secondary schools experience a lower self-esteem and feel inferiority complex in terms of the inputs provided by the government and the communities which manage those madrasahs. Moreover, with rare exceptions, the perception of the public is also that madrasas offer an inferior quality education. Madrasa students cannot at present compete with their peers from mainstream secondary schools in the labor market nor can they readily advance into higher education. Self-esteem and anxiety are two crucial components of students' lives. Students with positive self-esteem can face life with more confidence and show mild anxiety to reach their goals. On the other hand, students with low self-esteem can feel detached, dissatisfied with the current social relationship and show higher anxiety. During childhood and adolescence self-esteem begin to develop. At the same time, adolescents' anxiety also increases as they grow older. Low self-esteem and anxiety are often considered linked issues or problems that feed off one another. A person's ability to view themselves objectively and fairly may be directly related to how one handles stress, risk, and other anxiety-causing situations. A person with high anxiety level creates self-esteem problems. It is important to know whether self-esteem of Madrasa students is influenced by their anxiety. It is also helpful to the teachers of the Madrasa to know about anxiety level, self-esteem, and inferiority complex; and therefore help to take necessary steps to increase self-esteem and reduce anxiety & inferiority complex. It was identified the obstacles that Madrasas face in improving quality and becoming "unified" with the general national education stream. It can help Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board to plan, manage, monitor, and evaluate Madrasa education. Overall measuring the anxiety level, inferiority complex, and self-esteem of Madrasa students are noticed on government demands. Firstly, for the proper guideline of the madrasa students, it is necessary to know the anxiety level, inferiority complexity, and self-esteem of them. Secondly, a measure of anxiety level and inferiority complex would help to differentiate between distress due to inferiority and others. Thirdly, a student's inferiority problem can be related to another aspect of personality problem which is

influenced their anxiety level and self-esteem. When students feel in inferiority complexity their anxiety level increase and self-esteem decrease day by day, for these students do not develop their own career in desired fields, which is one of the most important issues in our country.

Objective of the Study

General Objective: The general objective of the study was to investigate the inferiority complex, anxiety level, and self-esteem of the Madrasa students.

Specific Objectives: Specific objectives were to

- a) identify the inferiority complex of the Madrasa Students;
- b) identify the anxiety level of the Madrasa Students;
- c) identify the self-esteem of the Madrasa Students;
- d) identify the significant factors affecting the Madrasa Students;
- e) investigate the relationships among inferiority complex, anxiety, and self-esteem based on Madrasa Students.

Methodology

Sources of Data: Primary data were collected from both the Madrasa (Aliya and Qoumi) and Secondary level students in Chittagong. Adapted Bangla version (Akram, Azizul, & Ariful, 2011) of Pati's (1974) Inferiority Questionnaire (IQ), adapted Bangla version (Ilyas, 2003) of Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem scale and Anxiety Scale for Bangladeshi Population (Farah & Roquia, 2004) were used for primary data collection. Secondary information was collected from books, journals, newspapers, and other published documents. Both quantitative and qualitative data were used to address the objectives of the research. Researchers' observations were also being incorporated in the study.

Sample Design: Chittagong region were selected for the study. Purposively selected respondents were administered the structured anxiety, self-esteem, and inferiority questionnaires. The total sample size was 950 based on the target population, the male and female respondents were 570 and 380 respectively considering the proportion of the students.

Method of Data Collection: The primary data (both quantitative and qualitative) were accumulated mostly to fulfill the objectives set forth in the study. For collecting the data a structured interview schedule was developed with a balanced combination of both closed and open-ended questions. The researchers collected the data from the respondents.

Data Processing: SPSS (22) program were used for analyzing the data. The Chi-Square Tests, Multiple Regressions, Percent, and Correlation were used to interpret findings of the research. Emphasis was also being given to qualitative analysis with quantitative data.

Results

After classifying the obtained inferiority complex, anxiety, and self-esteem scores, the data were analyzed by using SPSS (version-22) program. The obtained results are presented in the following tables and figures.

Inferiority Complexity of Madrasa Students

The Table 1 shows that the mean differences of inferiority complex according to Gender, Residence, and Socioeconomic Status of the Madrasa students.

Table 1: Mean and SD of Inferiority Complex Scores according to Gender, Residence, and Socioeconomic Status of the Madrasa Students

Gender	Mean	SD	Residence	Mean	SD	Socioeconomic Status	Mean	SD
Male	2.61	.377	Residential	2.58	.358	Higher	2.47	.356
Female	2.52	.359	Non-residential	2.57	.375	Middle	2.57	.380
						Lower	2.62	.281
Total	2.57	.372		2.57	.372		2.57	.372

Table 2: Multiple Regression of Inferiority Complex Scores according to Madrasa Students

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
Constant	2.991	.158		18.961	.001
Age	-.033	.009	-.120	-3.460	.001
Gender	-.100	.026	-.133	-3.835	.001
Residence	.020	.034	.021	.598	.550
Socioeconomic Status	.069	.033	.067	2.108	.035
Educational Qualification of Respondent	-.007	.008	-.030	-.867	.386
Number of Sibling	.005	.007	.021	.643	.520

Anxiety Level of Madrasa Students

The figures in Table 3 indicate that the mean differences of anxiety level according to Gender, Residence, and Socioeconomic Status of the Madrasa students.

Table 3: Mean and SD of Anxiety Level according to Gender, Residence, and Socioeconomic Status of the Madrasa Students

Gender	Mean	SD	Residence	Mean	SD	Socioeconomic Status	Mean	SD
Male	1.97	.413	Residential	1.97	.402	Higher	1.96	.368
Female	1.96	.365	Non-residential	1.96	.392	Middle	1.97	.385
						Lower	1.92	.479
Total	1.96	.394		1.96	.394		1.96	.394

The Multiple Regressions state that there was no significant difference in anxiety level according to gender, residence, and socioeconomic status of the Madrasa students. Lower socioeconomic status of the Madrasa students showed comparatively lower anxiety level.

Table 4: Multiple Regression of Anxiety Level according to Madrasa Students

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
Constant	1.860	.169		10.988	.001
Age	.005	.010	.017	.471	.638
Gender	.001	.028	.001	.042	.966
Residence	-.009	.036	-.009	-.243	.808
Socioeconomic Status	-.018	.035	-.016	-.506	.613
Educational Qualification of Respondent	.014	.008	.058	1.654	.099
Number of Sibling	.008	.008	.034	1.047	.295

Self-esteem of Madrasa Students

The Table 5 shows that the mean differences of self-esteem according to Gender, Residence, and Socioeconomic status of the Madrasa students.

Table 5: Mean and SD of Self-esteem Scores according to Gender, Residence, and Socioeconomic Status of the Madrasa Students

Gender	Mean	SD	Residence	Mean	SD	Socioeconomic Status	Mean	SD
Male	1.96	.412	Residential	1.96	.401	Higher	1.95	.367
Female	1.95	.364	Non-residential	1.95	.391	Middle	1.96	.384
						Lower	1.91	.478
Total	1.95	.393		1.95	.393		1.95	.393

The Multiple Regressions indicate that there was no significant difference in self-esteem according to gender, residence, and socioeconomic status of the Madrasa students. But lower socioeconomic status of the students find comparatively lower self-esteem.

Table 6: Multiple Regression of Self-esteem Scores according to Madrasa Students

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
Constant	1.860	.169		10.988	.001
Age	.005	.010	.017	.471	.638
Gender	.001	.028	.001	.042	.966
Residence	-.009	.036	-.009	-.243	.808
Socioeconomic status	-.018	.035	-.016	-.506	.613
Educational Qualification of respondent	.014	.008	.058	1.654	.099
Number of Sibling	.008	.008	.034	1.047	.295

Factors Affecting the Madrasa Students

The mean differences among the items of inferiority complex stated that the following items of inferiority complex of the Madrasa students were possessed poor

Figure 1. Means comparison among items of inferiority complex of the Madras students





Table 7: Percentage of Inferiority Complex Scores according to Items

Items	Strongly				Strongly Disagree
	Agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	
Do you think you are the best among siblings?	17.8	34.1	30.8	8.40	8.90
Is it irritating to obey elders?	18.2	10.1	10.2	11.2	50.3
Did you get toys whatever you want at childhood?	24.3	24.3	37.0	7.30	7.10
Were you stubborn to get cloths?	12.1	18.6	18.6	20.0	30.7
Can you make friendship with others easily?	47.0	33.4	8.60	7.40	3.60

Items	Strongly				Strongly Disagree
	Agree	Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	
Did you play with friends regularly?	57.6	31.9	3.00	4.40	3.10
Do your friends help you properly?	41.8	41.5	7.80	4.90	4.00
Do you get angry on small provocation?	9.00	15.0	10.0	26.4	39.6
Do you love to talk with friends about your work?	45.6	39.4	4.70	5.00	5.30
Do you love to interact with elders?	34.4	32.9	9.40	13.6	9.70
Do you like to find mistakes of others?	3.80	3.50	10.5	16.3	65.9
Do you like to show different work than others?	21.9	29.5	16.5	11.9	20.2
Do you want help of God before doing any work?	81.9	12.5	2.80	1.30	1.50
Do you work hard to improve yourself?	62.3	28.7	5.00	1.60	2.40

Figure 2. Means comparison among items of self-esteem of madras students



Relations between Inferiority Complex and Self-esteem of Madrasa Students

Self-esteem and inferiority complex were negatively correlated (-.48) that means if inferiority complex increases, self-esteem decreases based on Madrasa students. Self-esteem and anxiety level also negatively correlated (-.53) but anxiety level and inferiority complex was positively correlated (.45).

Discussion

The research was designed to examine the inferiority complex, anxiety, and self-esteem of Madrasah students. The analysis of results revealed that there was a significant difference in inferiority complex according to gender and socioeconomic status of the Madrasa students (Table 1). Male (2.61) were observed better among the Madrasa students than those of female (2.52) students, but the lower socioeconomic status of Madrasa students was better in the case of inferiority complex (Figure 1). The Multiple Regressions (Table 2) also indicate that there was a significant difference in inferiority

complex according to gender and socioeconomic status of Madrasa students. Male (Male = 2.61; Female = 2.52) and lower socioeconomic status (Higher = 2.47; Middle = 2.57; and Lower = 2.62) of the students find better in case of inferiority complex (Table 3 & 4). But there was no significant difference in inferiority complex according to the residence of Madrasa students. There was no significant difference in self-esteem according to gender and residence of Madrasa students (Table 5). But the lower socioeconomic status of the students possessed lower self-esteem. The Multiple Regressions (Table 6) also indicate that there was no significant difference in self-esteem according to gender, residence, and socioeconomic status of Madrasa students. Lower socioeconomic status (Higher = 1.95; Middle = 1.96; and Lower = 1.91) of Madrasa students find comparatively lower self-esteem. The analysis of results also revealed that self-esteem and inferiority complex were negatively correlated (-.48) that means if inferiority complex increases, self-esteem decreases based on Madrasa students.

The reasons behind these inconsistent findings the male students can get preferential treatment in economic, psychological, and political realms. Gender bias in virtually all aspects of education creates patterns of differential education for male and female students (Lee, Loeb, & Helen, 1995). These patterns are evident in discouragement of female students both through formal curricular materials and informal classroom interaction; differential course-taking, differential assessment and testing- methods, skill areas, format, content, and context; differential expectations and attitudes of teachers, administrators and parents based on a combination of sex and socioeconomic status (Moritz, Werner, & Collani, 2006; Greaney, Khandker, & Alam, 1998; Jonsson, 2000). It can be stated that differences in self-esteem and educational systems of males and females students were primarily due to social factors influencing them in their life. These inconsistency results can be explained as madrasa education suffers from some acute problems such as lack of necessary standard syllabus, necessary equipment's, and trained teaching staff (Akerlof & Rachel, 2002). Here the financial problem was also very serious. The authority was not giving due importance to this education and to its need. This negligence would be removed for the greater interest of the society. Madrasa students would not suffer from the inferiority complex. They would realize that they can be the true followers of Islam and honest leaders of the nation by this education. It must be stated that as things stand currently, in order to be compatible with present socioeconomic demands, the Madrasa curriculum requires significant improvement and diversification in coursework, while sustaining a focus on the core religious courses. A serious inclusion of modern disciplines would not only help bridge increasing gaps between Madrasa-educated and lay-educated Muslims but would also help produce Muslims who were religious scholars, able to effectively administer the increasingly diversifying and specialized public and private sectors, and able to establish needed dialogues both within the Muslim community and between Muslims and non-Muslims of different faiths and persuasions (Asadullah & Chaudhury, 2013).

The inferiority complex might not necessarily develop in the context of specific tasks or goals. It might develop for more general or abstract things also. For example, a person might feel that he is not very good looking compared to others and this might become the cause of inferiority complex for that person. Likewise, if a person is unable to make friends then that person might feel that nobody likes him and that he lacks the qualities of having good friends. Also, if a person, compared to others, is confused about his goals in life then he might begin to feel insecure and think that he is good for nothing (Bandura, 1982). This continuous feeling can cause an inferiority complex. Inferiority complex can become a menace for the individual and can lead to many other problems. The person might develop a feeling of inadequacy. A person might also have disappointment, dissatisfaction, depression, fearfulness, shyness, self-pity, insecurity, loneliness, withdrawal, etc. If inferiority complex becomes too overwhelming and lasts for a longer period of time, there is a possibility that it may engulf the person in such a strong way that it changes into the superiority complex. When a person develops too much of the inferiority complex, then it turns into the superiority complex. In superiority complex, the individual feels that a good way to overcome inferiority is to make others feel inferior and thus become superior. For this, the person might become arrogant and aggressive in his mannerisms. The person might try to show off and indulge in too much of self-praise and bragging (Bean & Keller, 1994). The person might also try to bully others to gain a sense of satisfaction. The person does all this in an effort to regain his lost self-worth. The person tries to seek the attention of others and pretends to be something that he actually is not. The individual tries to convince and prove him as well as others that he is not inferior. The person also tries to think of himself as someone who is highly valuable and probably the best. Such a person might seem to be very confident from the outside. He might appear to hold a very high opinion of himself. But, this may not be the case in actuality. The person is just trying to hide his shortcomings and tries to overcome his excessive feelings of inferiority. This attitude is perceived as obnoxious and rude by others. By getting into such behavior, the person might also be making a fool out of him. This further exacerbates the feeling of worthlessness within that person. It may also lead to more and more aggressive behavior or even chronic loneliness and depression. The best way to overcome inferiority complex, according to Adler, is compensation. If a person feels that he lacks in certain ability, then that person can try to develop strength in some other ability. The individual can enhance such skills that make him feel good about himself and develop self-confidence (Baumeister, 1993). In this way, the person feels that it does not matter if he lacks in ability because he is very good in some other ability. For instance, a person who feels that he is not good in studies can become good in sports. A person who feels that he is not good looking can become very good in studies and other intellectual tasks. A person who feels that he does not have a good speaking ability can develop good skills in writing or painting. In this way, an individual can compensate his lack of ability by developing and enhancing some other ability (Harter, 1989). Another way to overcome inferiority complex is to have a high level of self-awareness. A high level of self-awareness will enable the person to know himself in a much better way. Due to this an individual can recognize his strengths and weaknesses and work accordingly. If

the person realizes his strengths and true abilities, then there is no way that the person could develop an inferiority complex. Many people become too much sensitive about what other people feel or think about them. They begin to worry a lot about how others see them (Hanushek, 2003). This is completely unnecessary and a waste of time. An individual knows himself better and if he goes according to others then there is a possibility that the person might get into things in which he lacks the proper ability (Bickel, 1983). This may cause constant failures and eventually lead to the inferiority complex. Comparing oneself to others also does no good to the person. If a person is good at something that does not mean that another individual also has to be good in that. The individual might have his own strengths and should focus on that. Trying to ape others can be misleading and lead to insecurity, which may further develop into the inferiority complex. However, in most cases, successfully learning to overcome inferiority complex comes from a lot of hard work with a trusted therapist.

The findings can also be explained as students with low self-esteem see temporary setbacks as permanent, intolerable conditions, and a sense of pessimism prevails. This can place students at risk for stress and mental health problems, as well as real difficulties solving different kinds of problems and challenges they encounter. Students with healthy self-esteem tend to enjoy interacting with others. They're comfortable in social settings and enjoy group activities as well as independent pursuits. When challenges arise, they can work toward finding solutions and voice discontent without belittling themselves or others (Harter, 1989). Students with self-esteem feel good about themselves; feel proud of what they can do; believe in themselves, even when they don't succeed at first; see their own good qualities; feel liked, loved, and respected; accept themselves, even when they make mistakes. Students with low self-esteem: don't feel good about themselves; don't think they are as good as others; think mostly bad things about themselves; think of the times they fail, rather than the times they do well; are hard on themselves and give up easily; don't feel liked, accepted, or respected. Students are experts at distinguishing genuine feedback from empty compliments. They learn to dismiss vague words of praise as insincere and perhaps even phony (Mumtaz, 2008). Comments that suggest the thoughtful appreciation of their work, on the other hand, are meaningful to them. Expressing confidence in a student's ability is important; pep talks alone might not be enough. A student can gain self-esteem from involvement in activities which the student cares about. If the student encounters academic difficulties and learns that failure is a normal part of learning and that everyone experiences disappointment or frustration at some point. But most of the cases students with low self-esteem often are isolated from their classmates and didn't realize the facts about the situations (Sarason, 1984).

In summary, the present research has revealed that inferiority complex and self-esteem were observed poor among the madrasa students. It also indicates that the male was observed better than those of female students, but the lower socioeconomic status of the students was better in the case of inferiority complex. It also indicates that there was no significant difference in self-esteem according to gender, residence and socioeconomic status of Madrasa students. Lower socioeconomic status of the Madrasa students found

comparatively the lower self-esteem. It also revealed that self-esteem and inferiority complex were negatively correlated (-.48). The findings of this study have important implications for policy-making and suggest that madrasa education is needed to be special care for the welfare of the nation. However, despite some significant findings of the study certain limitations need to be mention here. The participants were not taken from all parts of Bangladesh, and others variables (e.g. stress, frustration, social class, social interaction etc.) were not incorporated as the probable explanatory variables in the present study. So, future studies can be carried out on large samples from all parts of Bangladesh and at more fundamental level including all other variables.

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Nonviolent Protest and Capital Punishment of War Criminals: The Bangladesh Perspectives

Md. Moynul Haque ¹

Abstract: In the month of February in 2013, an unusual type of political action took place in the surface of politics in Bangladesh which was centered on the issue of capital punishment of war criminals. The country witnessed biggest platform of protest of unarmed people at the Shahbagh which was launched to support the demand of death sentence to all alleged war criminals and bring them to justice. The important dimension of the protest was the nonviolent character which brought to the civilian led protest a great momentum. This paper is, therefore, an attempt to highlight the nonviolent aspect of the 2013 Shahbagh protest. Drawn from Gene Sharp's 198 methods of nonviolent action and following Kurt Schock's nonviolent action approach, the author has tested useful nonviolent techniques and analyzed how nonviolent protest helped to advance the demand of capital punishment. The data presented here are mostly collected from secondary sources including books, journals and published newspaper articles in both print and online media. The analysis of the paper suggests that the methods of nonviolent action played a crucial part in making the Shahbagh protest more participatory and turned out to be effective tool to advance great causes. However, the author argues that nonviolent type of protest is more effective strategy to challenge against injustice, or to bring about political change.

Introduction

Nonviolence is a 'pragmatic' political action (Schock, 2005: 37) and a 'strategy for political change' (Chenoweth, 2013: 271). It has gained much attention recently for its potentials in bringing remarkable outcome across the globe. The world has already witnessed the efficacy of pragmatic nonviolent resistance in a number of countries in different occasions: in the Philippine, just only four days of active nonviolent action helped ousted two decades long dictatorship of Marcos; orange revolution brought to an end of corrupt regime in less than two months in Ukraine; Tunisia and Egypt have experienced the power of nonviolent action that led to the downfall of long term dictatorships in a matter of weeks (Chenoweth 2013; Nepstad and Kurtz, 2012 cited in Haque, 2016a). The above mentioned nonviolent protests testify the power of the unarmed people's struggles for the cause of political change and social justice.

Bangladesh witnessed the magnificent outbreak of nonviolent type of political action during 2013 Shahbagh protest which was directed in support of the capital punishment of alleged war criminals of the country (Haque, 2016a). The initial stage of the protest was performed in a controlled manner and the movement organizers used varieties of nonviolent tactics including sit-ins, slogans, candle light vigil etc. to prosecute conflict peacefully. As the protest got the nonviolent character, it could easily attract huge number of people from different strata of society who had grievances against the alleged war criminals and who shouted for a fresh start in politics. The Shabagh event, therefore,

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testify that active nonviolent political fight can be a catalyst to press demand for justice and to bring about social and political change in the country. Against this backdrop it is pertinent to review the Shahbagh phenomena by asking to what extent nonviolent protest was supportive to advance the demand of the capital punishment of war criminals in Bangladesh.

Protest and agitations are common in Bangladesh. History suggests that after the democratic transition in 1991, political party led protest had run only to gain political interests; people's aspirations have rarely put forwarded into the demand of action. Politically motivated protest often generated violence and received suppressive response from the competing parties. But in decades later, the issue of the trial of war crimes united Bangladeshi people in such way which is not seen in the history quite near before. Moreover, it is quite astonishing that people expressed their outward response with such euphoric mood in the events of the Shahbagh protest. As New York Times' Jim Yardley rightly differentiate the cause of the protest mobilization. He pointed out the efficacy and popularity of the protest by claiming that,

"Shahbagh protests, as the demonstrations over the verdict have come to be known, were organized by bloggers and have attracted poets, artists, social activists and untold numbers of other citizens" (Yardley, 2013 cited in Haque 2016a:76).

Therefore, the Shahbagh protest is a unique example of civil resistance in South Asia where unarmed people waged active struggle to support their demand.

The objective for greater nonviolent protest mobilization in the Shahbagh was quite new. It did not though necessarily replicate the spirit of Tahrir square, or like other nonviolent struggle around the world, so to say (Haque, 2016b). The nonviolent action at Shahbagh was directed not against any government, not to wage war against any dictatorial or corrupt regime, even not to stand against bullets and batons. But the Shahbagh awakening was in true sense demonstrated the people's power for changing the country's political destiny by cleaning the existence of war criminals through the execution of capital punishment.

Going beyond the practice of conventional type of political action in Bangladesh, the Shahbagh protest demonstrates distinctiveness in both the operational and strategic aspects. Normally, the political party led actions are heavily dependent on violent strategy which is often reflected through the hartal , picketing and other subversive activities. From the last two decades, Bangladesh has encountered relatively high level of violent political action that has caused severe disruptions in the democracy. Violent means of protest against the government power only generated further violence. The nonviolent Shahbagh protest is, therefore, a stumbling block to change the protest style in the country's confrontational politics.

The popular demand of the Shahbagh protesters had run through non-institutionalized channels and maintained nonviolent tactics. The protest was performed and advanced by the activists coming from wider section of society including veteran freedom fighters, artists, activists, professionals, civil society spokesman, school going and university

students. Above all, Bangladesh saw the astounding participation of all classes of people in the protest which is quite uncommon in the contemporary political mobilization. The three minutes silence of all government and semi-government establishments, earth drawing, candle light vigil etc. were among other reliable nonviolent strategy which were constructively employed to press for attaining intended objectives (Haque, 2016a).

Nevertheless, given how quickly and effectively the nonviolent action worked in the political space in Bangladesh, it is surprising that scholars have paid little attention to this dynamics. Against this backdrop, this paper will try to address this issue with particular focus on the nonviolent strategy and techniques which were applied during the protest to sought for capital punishment of convicted war criminals in Bangladesh.

The structure of this paper goes as follows. The second section of the paper will be dealt with methodology. The third section will briefly focus on analytical framework of nonviolent action approach developed by Kurt Schock. In the fourth section, the context of the emergence of nonviolent protest would be presented. The fifth section of this paper will analyze the techniques used by the protesters. The final section will be concluded preceded by a brief analysis of evolving political complications centering on nonviolent action and the trial of war criminals.

Methodology

This research paper has followed qualitative methodology. A descriptive method of analysis has been used. In doing so, factual analysis of the event as well as author's personal observation has been taken into account. The data and information presented here are secondary in nature which has been collected from scholarly books, journal articles and newspapers. The analytical framework has been drawn by combining Gene Sharp's prescribed 198 nonviolent methods and Kurt Schock's nonviolent action approach. Three types of nonviolent methods are categorized and charted by enlisting nine different segments and nineteen nonviolent techniques. The paper has mainly taken into consideration only those nonviolent methods which were found common in the different segments of the Shahbagh protest.

Nonviolent Action Approach

The nonviolent action approach emphasizes the use of the nonviolent methods by the participants in the protest. When sufficient number of participants uses nonviolent methods to disobey or pursue demands for a sufficient amount of time, the success of the action is more likelihood (Schock, 2005). Drawing on Gene Sharp, Schock suggested his nonviolent action approach which is build on three categories of methods: methods of protest and persuasion- a indirect contentious action by means of symbolic expression; methods of noncooperation- challenge the legitimacy of the government by deliberate withdrawal, restriction of cooperation; and the methods of nonviolent intervention- an acts of interposition by disruption during the course of contentious struggle.

The tactical methods of nonviolent action in the collective participation can produce successful political change by the mechanism of nonviolent coercion- an action based on nonphysical pressure. What Schock argued "through nonviolent coercion, change is

achieved against the government's will as a result of the challenger's successful undermining of the government's power, legitimacy and ability to control the situation through methods of nonviolent action" (Schock, 2005: 42).

Trial of War Criminals and the Emergence of Nonviolent Protest

The Shahbagh protest was primarily initiated on 5 February 2013 when the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) declared its verdict to life sentence to one of the key accused of war crimes namely Abdul Quader Mollah (Haque, 2016b). Bangladeshi people, especially the post 71 young generations who follows the secular stream of politics became shocked over the trial. The youths who long waited to bring alleged war criminals to justice became so furious when Quader showed victory sign with a lopsided smile at the time he came out of the court. In fact, 'The V-sign triggered the Shahbagh protest that demanded capital punishment for all war criminals and a ban on the politics of Jamaat' (Chowdhury and Islam, 2013).

In an immediate open reaction, a young group of secular online activists named themselves Bloggers and Online Activists Network (BOAN) called for the mass demonstration at the Shahbagh- a busy intersection of the city Dhaka- which became the epicenter of protest within a very short time. The participants' being dissatisfied with the lenient verdict, shouted government's intervention to make changes to the shortcomings of the ICT act that could allow the prosecution to appeal against the verdict of life imprisonment and seek the higher sentence of execution. Along with the principle demand of the death sentence, the Shahbagh protestors also vowed to eliminate the Islamic fundamentalism from the country.

The mode of action in the protest was very organized and confined in exercising different forms of nonviolent tactics such as instant sit-ins, stand-in, chanting slogans, candle light vigil etc.; avoiding from physical force. This strategy of nonviolence worked well and could able to attract by the large number of people from different backgrounds who had wrath against all those collaborators and their associates who allegedly killed innocent people during the liberation war of independence and thereby committed war crimes. The public voices of the Shahbagh protest continuously demanded the effective judicial action to those razakars including Quader. The power of nonviolent action of the Shahbagh protesters compelled the authority to revise the existing ICT act that eventually led the court for declaring its verdict of death sentence to him in September 2013. Though months later, the successful execution of Quader on December 2013 is marking the unprecedented victory of the people's power and undoubtedly the victory of nonviolent strategy.

Nonviolent Protest Style: Methods and Strategies Applied

The Shahbagh protest was primarily nonviolent in nature, which is the reason for which it could able to mobilize a large number of people in the event (Haque, 2016b). However, the protest had gone through number of segments and varieties of nonviolent tactics were employed which in many directions matches with the nonviolent action approach advocated by Gene Sharp. In addition, the protestors brought new innovations in methods and techniques in their strategy which can be shown in the following table:

Table 1: Nonviolent methods employed at the protest

Segment	Method employed
<i>The methods of protest and persuasions</i>	
Formal statements	001. Public speeches
Communications with a wider audience	007. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols 008. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
Symbolic public acts	018. Displays of flags and symbolic colors 019. Wearing of symbols 021. Delivering symbolic objects 024. Symbolic lights 025. Displays of portraits 026. Paint as protest 030. Rude gestures
Pressures on individuals	034. Vigils
Drama and Music	035. Humorous skits and pranks 036. Performances of plays and music 037. Singing
Processions	038. Marches
<i>The methods of social and economic noncooperation</i>	
Ostracism of persons	056. Selective social boycott
Action by holders of financial	086. Withdrawal of bank deposits
<i>The methods of nonviolent intervention</i>	
Physical intervention	162. Sit-in 163. Stand-in

In the methods of protest and persuasions, the segment of formal statements was carried out through the regular speech which was very effective in urging people to be united under the common spirit of the Shahbagh. The communications with the wider audience were established through the slogans, carrying banners and festoons. The young men and women were shouting slogans, singing songs, etc. Thousands of people chanted slogans we demand death sentence of all 'Razakars' (collaborators of war criminal). The Shahbagh protestors largely used the symbolic expression and communicative tools to appeal the countrymen to show their strength. The students of liberal arts painted streets, drew cartoons and hanged effigies of war crime suspects at the Shahbagh. The protesters

brought out marches and processions with candle light at night all through the street, screened films on the independence war, and staged street plays. A huge display of caricatures of war crimes suspects was put on the road.

On 7 February, thousands of protestors mobilized at the Shahbagh square handed with Bangladeshi flags, banners, posters and placards in support of their demands. The eighth day of the protest observed a three-minute silence to press the demand for death penalty of war criminals. Tens of thousands of people stood silent at the key intersection at the Shahbagh. This methods of nonviolent action also observed by the government offices, shopkeepers closed for business to stand on the road sides. Similar scenes were seen in the play ground where national cricket league halted for a while to express their solidarity with the Shahbagh. The power of silence has been narrated in the local news paper:

A silence that was more overpowering than the strongest of slogans, a silence stronger than the high-tempered steel. A silence that cried in the loudest of voices: We want just trial of the war criminals. We want justice for the genocide committed 42 years ago (The Daily Star, 2013).

The participants' did innovate varieties of protest tactics including millions of candle lighting in all 64 districts at a time. The protest also marked by the nonviolent methods of honoring deaths. On 16 February, thousands gathered around the blogger Rajib Haider's funerals to show honor to death. The protestors showed rude gestures against the suspected killers of Rajib and the demand of death sentence of war criminals became stronger at the farewell. In an another event on 23 February, the protestors walked in a rally at Rayerbazar Baddhabhumi (mass killing ground)- the burial place of martyrs of 1971 (Jahan, 2013).

In the methods of noncooperation, both the methods of economical and social refusal were employed by the protesters. On 8 February, the elated participants took oath to boycott entire ally with Jamaat and their possessions. The gonojagoron mancha (mass awakening platform) urged the countrymen suspension of economic relationship by announcing boycott of all business institutions including the Islami Bank and Ibn Sina trust run by war criminals. They pledged to withdrawal all the social and commercial establishments including media outlets, educational institutions and coaching centers of the Islamist party as punishment (Mustafa, 2013).

The methods of nonviolent intervention were the most common and every day practicing strategy of the protest. The participants regularly arranged mass sit-in and stand-in where energetic crowd vowed to continue their demonstration until the demand is achieved. The all day long sit-in and stand-in proved to be the strategic choice of the protestors that continued throughout the whole month of February. It virtually paralyzed the city transport system. This obstruction was intended nothing but to create pressure on the authority to take effective action.

To summarize, the protest strategy- innovative methods and tactics- were instrumental for making the protest more vibrant. The tactical diversity became the boon of the protest.

The mass gatherings became a centre of innovation where the young people exercised their diverse talents right from their own position. Different types of nonviolent tactics were employed following different segments. It is found that the nonviolent protest and persuasion was significant for greater mobilization. The protest events e.g. singing song, holding colorful banners, festoons, candle et cetera highly attracted the mass people. Some methods of this segment including three minutes silence, road drawing were quite exceptional events; not usually seen in the courses of political protest in Bangladesh. The low barriers of physical participation indeed helped participants to carry out different methods of this segment.

The methods of the nonviolent intervention, although not new in the regular political action, were largely employed by the Shahbagh protesters. The methods of this segment are highly linked with the methods of protest and persuasion. The large numbers of sit-in and stand-in have helped to figure out the strength of the protest, thereby media could publicized the protest as collective human sea. This method was also associated with the benefits of risk tolerance, for that numbers of female participants could easily occupy the street following sit-in without having any fear running to and fro. The methods of non-cooperation were largely moved by the communicative actions of the wider audiences. The provoking slogans and speeches given by different people including the intellectuals, activists and freedom fighters made the protest more lively that fueled the courage for demanding the social and economic boycott of all war criminal's establishments.

Politics of War Crimes and Nonviolent Action

The erstwhile political context of Bangladesh politics in 2013, it is reasonable to believe that the trial of the war criminals remained the well enough stimulus political issue for political parties including the ruling party Bangladesh Awami League (AL), the oppositions Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and their ally Jamaat-e- Islami (JI). However, no political action could go free without the interference or at least the acquiescence of any political party. This evolving reality is true to the Shahbagh scenario that has created a big question mark about the protest's actual intention. In fact, 'politics of Bangladesh has been affected by this protestation to such an extent that the whole country is divided into two groups and the two major political alliances are in a hurry to take advantage of it' (Hasan 2013). Like other institutions, both the opposition political parties and the incumbent had interest to advance their decision- whether they will back the Shahbagh, support the protesters or stay neutral. Thus, close scrutiny of how government and the political parties have responded to the protest enables us to discern the intricate linkages of the politics with the protest.

A number of political factors shapes why the Shahbagh protesters became the targeted enemy of the Islamic fundamentalists, how legitimate was the Shahbagh in the eyes of BNP and their ally, and how the ruling AL engaged with the protest. When the demands of the Shahbagh protesters increased from the death sentence to ban on the Jamaat's politics, and when the secular blogger's activities at the Shahbagh were hurting religious sentiments by defaming Islam using the internet, the collision between the secular and religious fundamentalist came to the front more acutely.

Jamaat- the largest Islamic party whose leaders were under trial for war crimes- wanted to create a parallel agitation to undermine the Shahbagh protest. They tactically allied with the Hefajat-e-Islam, a newly floated Madrasa educated activists. The Jamaat instigated the Hefajat's activists against the Shahbagh protesters on the plea of blasphemy acts of the atheist bloggers. This is clearly a sign that the protest got inconvenient turn 'into a battle between the secular and religious elements within the country' (Rabbee, 2013) which was not anticipated by the Shahbagh officials. Ironically, the strength of the Shahbagh was mistakenly directed for multifarious issues, instead of the single demand that the protestors gathered for, which essentially enabled the Islamic fanatics to wage confrontation. This plot of the Shahbagh turned itself and the whole political scenario of the country more complicated.

The reaction of the then main opposition party BNP was somewhat confusing and suspicious as the party officials were expressing mixed reactions about the Shahbagh protest. BNP being the ally of Jamaat and also two of their party officials were facing the trial, cautiously welcomed the spirit of the Shahbagh's youth. The party wanted to capitalize the spirit of Shahbagh's youth and expected to gain political advantages from the Shahbagh platform by inciting the protestors against the government's malgovernance, misdeeds, corruptions and failures. It is interesting to note that BNP did not completely stand against the demands of the Shahbagh protestors but they were long demanding the fair trial procedure that will maintain the transparency, objectivity and international standards.

There heightened a concern that the Shahbagh protest has been co-opted by the political party especially the ruling AL. Evidence shows that the organizers of the protest tried to keep away political leaders by not allowing them to hold any speech or even carry political banners in the spot. But the opposition party questioned the neutrality claiming that the protest 'aligned itself more and more with the pro-government elements of the society' (Rabbee, 2013). As the Shahbagh contained a huge mob from different ideologies and political backings, the whole politics of the country was revolving around who the net beneficiaries of the protest are. It was apparent that the AL tried to control the Shahbagh may be form the fear that the mass people might unite against the socio-economic and political problems of the country which would be more challenging to tackle at that time. It was better off for the government to back the protestors instead to repress, which could be backfired. Government wanted to act in a way that the people should not feel that they are not sympathetic to the demands of the Shahbagh protesters. This was indeed a political equation of the incumbent as the national election was imminent and it was very timely to achieve sympathy of the people showing them that the electoral pledge- the trial of war criminals- is being processed in their term.

Given the political complications, what nonviolent action meant for all those contending parties is subject to investigate. For the Jamaat, no matter what the nature and the objective of the Shahbagh protest was, they did not rely on nonviolent ethos while planning to curb down the spirit of the Shahbagh. BNP's safe side stance failed to recognize

the nonviolent spirit of the Shahbagh protestors. The party's anticipation proved wrong since the Shahbagh participants did not go for any violent action against the government during the protest. The ruling party's support was by all means a good impetus and became the plus point for the Shahbagh protestors.

At some point, one may pose skeptic argument that the political action of the Shahbagh protest has less affected by the appeal of nonviolence, since many other political incentives were provided for its strength. But at the same time it can be compelling to believe that the Shahbagh was predominantly occupied by mostly apolitical, leaderless unarmed people whose intention was in no way political mingling. The then situation of the Shahbagh was not restrictive for the participants and therefore intrusion of the political forces was unavoidable. Yet, amidst the political condensed scenario, the protest did not slip away throughout from its nonviolent strategy. However, the nonviolent Shahbagh protest proved to have great impact on the national politics, irrespective of its result. Its positive aspects may provide optimism to the political parties who believe that the protest has transformed the political consciousness of the mass people and it will much easier to mobilize them in future. Going beyond the political bias, this experience would inspire people to raise further demands which may change the political future of Bangladesh (Hasan, 2013).

Conclusion

As an exemplary case of pragmatic nonviolent political action in Bangladesh, this paper analyzed the recent 2013 Shahbagh protest and argued that the efficient use of the nonviolent approach contributed the protest to reach the peak in a very short time. What made the Shahbagh protest as distinct phenomenon is its entirely nonviolent nature. The more striking feature of the Shahbagh protest was that it introduced diverse communication methods including the social media engaging both the youth and female activists. No previous political action could easily exploit those non-institutional protest weapons. In short, for the efficacy and potentials of the nonviolent approach, the Shahbagh protest gained the momentum and became the remarkable chapter in the courses of political action in Bangladesh.

Finally, it can be suggested that the nonviolent action can be comparatively most effective tool to protest in Bangladesh. Whatever the goal and objectives of the protest, the nonviolent action continues to offer an excellent space to start active struggle towards a better political future in Bangladesh. People should wary with the point that there are no guarantees of the success of violent action, therefore it is vital to learn as much as possible from the experiences of the nonviolent action of the Shahbagh protest.

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Rohingya Crisis in the Light of International Refugee Convention 1951: A Study on Security Perspective of Bangladesh

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***Abstract:** After seeing the indescribable suffering of millions of displaced people during 2nd world war, the international community set up the 1951 International Refugee Convention, and later, the 1967 Protocol. In spite of having those sophisticated conventions, many ethnic minority groups, including the Rohingyas, have been suffering for a long time. The Rohingyas are harassed and persecuted by the Myanmar government and face attacks orchestrated by militant Buddhist monks. Due to these circumstances, Rohingya refugees started seeking shelter in Bangladesh in 1978. From that time Bangladesh has been showing its humanitarian virtues even though Bangladesh is not a signatory party of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Having huge population pressure of refugees- many of whom are committing crimes, engaging in militancy and causing environmental degradation in an ecologically sensitive area of the country- it is time for Bangladesh to rethink the Rohingya situation, giving priority to domestic and regional security issues.*

***Keywords:** Refugee Convention, Rohingya, Humanitarian Policy, National and Regional Security, State Policy, Minorities.*

Introduction

Bangladesh is a densely populated South-Asian country with 160 million people. Since its independence from Pakistan in 1971, it has been sharing a common border with two neighboring countries, namely, India, and Myanmar. Additionally, Bangladesh's relationship with Myanmar had been strengthened after Myanmar joined BIMSTEC in 1997. In spite of having reasonably good diplomatic relationship, the two countries have not been able to reach mutual agreements with regards to the Rohingya issue in recent years. This issue has been a serious concern for Bangladesh and also is a rising security threat for the country.

The Rohingyas are a maltreated Muslim minority group that lives in the northwestern part of the Rakhine (Arakan) state of Myanmar (Burma). They are considered to be a stateless people by the government of Myanmar and are not given any citizenship rights. They live under officially sanctioned discriminatory practices and the fear of routine attacks by local Buddhist groups (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

In 1978, almost 200,000 persecuted Rohingyas fled their home country and crossed the border into Bangladesh illegally. Again in 1991-92, the south-east district of Cox's Bazar of Bangladesh was encroached by approximately 250,000 Rohingyas (Nemoto, 2014). The refugee problem was largely resolved with the help of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which provided relief operations and helped with negotiating agreements on the repatriation of Rohingyas to Myanmar (Phiri, 2008).

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More recently, Bangladesh has faced a great influx of Rohingya refugees after the 2012 Rakhine State sectarian riots between Muslims and Buddhists (Manik, 2012). Rohingyas faced systematic violence and persecution by the government, while Buddhist rioters largely went unpunished, if not officially encouraged to engage in violence (BBC, 2014). Thousands of Rohingya people were forced to flee into neighboring countries, mostly to Bangladesh. Some fled by boat to Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Those fleeing by boat were identified as 'boat people' by international Media (Mckirdy & Mohsin, 2015).

Bangladesh, from a humanitarian point of view, gave shelter to displaced Rohingyas in Cox's Bazar district, even though Bangladesh is not a signatory party of 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Legally, Bangladesh is not obliged to accept them. However, some Rohingyas have been caught committing crimes. Some have been involved in communal violence (The Daily Star, 2012). Others have used fake Bangladeshi passports, tarnishing Bangladesh's image abroad (The Daily Star, 2015). The large number of refugees is also causing environmental degradation in a picturesque part of the country (Ahamed, 2010)

This research attempts to explain the main internal security concerns for Bangladesh and possible way-out of the crisis for Bangladesh.

Objectives of the Study

The aim of this study is to analyze the issues which can arise or have arisen due to huge Rohingya population inhabiting Bangladesh. The specific objectives of this study are:

1. To search for legal obligations for accepting or refusing Rohingyas.
2. To sort out security problems arising from sheltering Rohingyas.
3. To find probable way out for this unwelcome group.

Statement of the Research Problem

Rohingyas are a Muslim minority group from the Rakhine state in Myanmar who are persecuted by Myanmar government. To escape from persecution, large numbers of the group have fled to Bangladesh. This large unwelcomed population is causing problems for Bangladesh. Some are committing crimes and belittling Bangladesh's image worldwide (The Daily Star, 2015). Moreover, domestic and regional security may be threatened because of their high population growth rate (Al Jazeera, 2016) and distinct religious ideology (Nemoto, 2014) compared to multicultural and non-Muslim tribal residents of Chittagong region of Bangladesh.

Rohingya refugees are currently staying in Bangladesh are huge in numbers, around half a million. Furthermore, they do not enjoy 'first degree and second degree' rights, so they often need to engage in illegal activities to survive, from taking jobs at very low wages to involving themselves in drugs smuggling (Imran & Mian, 2014). To some extent, Rohingya refugees have already been engaged with smuggling and human trafficking in that porous border area (Yeasmin, 2016).

Cox's Bazar and the Chittagong hill tracts area have substantial environmental value with unique flora and fauna. It is also the biggest tourist destination of Bangladesh. Rohingya refugees have been cutting down valuable trees and making shelter illegally (Imran & Mian, 2014).

Whether by necessity for survival or plain criminal intent, some Rohingyas do not appear to be very respectful to local rules and regulations. As a result, law and order situation has deteriorated in Rohingya inhabitant areas. Besides, this area has multicultural and tribal non-Muslim inhabitants. Rohingyas can possibly spark ethnic conflict if they encroach upon areas inhabited by these non-Muslim groups.

Continuously observing these problems, it is necessary for the present researcher to focus on the Rohingya issue and explore possible way-outs for Bangladesh, as well as reiterate the need for establishing secured atmosphere for Bangladeshi citizens. It is essential to consider the country's own internal security, population, territory, environment, and socio-economic conditions.

Rohingya: A Historical Background

The Rohingyas are Muslim ethnic group having considerable similarities with Bengalis in terms of language and religion. However, they have their own dialect. They are Sunni Muslims living in the Arakan area of the northwestern part of Myanmar. Their history in Myanmar can be traced back to the Mrauk-U dynasty (1430-1785). This ethnic group lived together with the majority groups called the Buddhist Arakanese and Burmese in Mayu region (Nemoto, 2014).

After the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826), Indian immigrants were encouraged to migrate to northwestern parts of Burma by British officials. Some Muslims or Chittagongians responded to the call.

The first riots started when Japan occupied this area (1942-1945) driving out the British. The Muslim group worked for British and Buddhists assisted the Japanese. Since then, hostile relations between Buddhists and Muslims continue to exist. Myanmar has a discriminatory history in terms of citizenship rules. It has three categories of citizenship status. Generally, people who have been living there before 1823 are recognized as "Genuine". It has a second tier group, those who obtained the Union Citizenship previous to 1948, and finally, those who have been naturalized after the suspension of the 1948 Union Citizenship Act (Martin, 1991). However, while Myanmar citizens consist of 135 ethnic groups among them Burmese are majority (69%); unfortunately, Rohingyas do not belong to any authorized ethnic group (Nemoto, 2014). Moreover, they (Rohingyas) are treated as illegal or foreigners, and settlers from Chittagong, Bangladesh. They are also denied Bangladeshi citizenship rights, as there is no evidence that they are recent immigrants from Bangladesh.

Theoretical Framework

The most relevant theories which are pertinent with this study are Human Rights, theory of Non-Refoulement, ethos of 1951 and 1967 refugee laws, and finally the 1969 doctrine

of Organization of African Unity. Essentially the concerned theories have been explored for theoretical explanation and perception of refugee issues and Bangladesh's legal position towards Rohingya refugees.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th December, 1948. Article 14(1) stated, "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution". It is one of the fundamental principles of human rights designed to protect human beings from persecution.

Non-Refoulment principle is another great doctrine for the protection of asylum seekers and refugees. According to the article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, "No contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". Non-refoulment has many limitations as other international laws. For instance, according to non-refoulment principle only contracting countries are obliged to abide by this principle. So it is not applicable for many countries including Bangladesh as it is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The 1967 Protocol is independent of, though integrally related to the 1951 Convention. It, along with 1951 Refugee Convention covers three areas such as the basic refugee definition, the legal status of refugee in their country of asylum, and State's obligations towards cooperation with UNHCR (Jastram & Achiron, 2001).

Organization of African Unity (OAU) is regional body that deals with specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. It follows 1951 Refugee definition but also includes more practical considerations: any person compelled to leave his/her country because of "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality".

Rohingyas are stateless people from the northwestern part of Arakan state of Myanmar. Their persecution by Myanmar government is getting worldwide attention. They do not have citizenship rights in Myanmar or Bangladesh. Although lacking an official nationality, they meet the definition of article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The international refugee law is the legal document for the protection of refugees worldwide and it is a part of human rights law. Generally, human rights are the basic rights which human beings are entitled at birth. For example, right of life.

However, reality is far away from the theories. Theories, which have been developed for the protection of refugees, are often only ornamental; not functional. Rohingyas are not considered citizen; they are deprived from civil, political, economic, and cultural rights in their home country Myanmar. In reality, they have no freedom of movement, and need to permission for traveling from one place to another in their own country (Imran & Mian, 2014). In Bangladesh their conditions are the same as it has not yet developed sophisticated laws which can deal with refugees. Normally, refugees are permitted to

enjoy all rights afforded to them by the international refugee laws and human rights laws but these may not be applicable for Rohingyas in the real sense. It might not be an exaggeration to say that they are mostly an 'unwanted and undesirable' group. International Human Rights laws are possibly silent there.

Methodology

This study is a qualitative in nature. Data was collected by reviewing books, national and international journal articles and newspapers. Moreover, electronic sources were utilized to gather and sort out information about the Rohingya crisis. Secondary sources were used to draw assumptions for security issues that may arise in future. Observational method was also applied to complete this study.

Literature Review

Coutts, E. (2005), in his writing on The Rohingya Refugee Situation in Bangladesh and Nemoto, K. (2014), in The Rohingya Issue: A Throny Obstacle between Burma (Myanmar) and Bangladesh, both have described the history of Rohingya people and show how Myanmar treats them. They also tried to focus on Bangladesh's stand towards Rohingyas. Coutts described the negotiations between Bangladesh and UNHCR on Rohingya issues. On the other hand, Nemoto attempted to sort out the history of Rohingya in terms of their origin. However, what types of challenges Bangladesh will probably face due to the Rohingya pressure is absent in their studies. They also did not mention Bangladesh's position toward the 1951 International Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

Ashraful, M. (2016), in his research entitled Legal status and the protection of refugees under the existing legal framework of South Asian countries: Special focus on Bangladesh and India, Imran & Mian (2014), in their article entitled The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Vulnerable Group in Law and Policy, and Mohammad, N (2012), in his writing Refugee Protection Under the Constitution of Bangladesh : A brief Overview, tried to explain security issues of Bangladesh and refugee protections laws, obligations, and legal issues related to the protection of Rohingyas. Their research could not explain how Bangladesh can deny acceptance of Rohingyas refugees.

Phiri, P. P. (2008), in his research, Rohingyas and refugee status in Bangladesh, focused on a solution by negotiation on Rohingyas issues between UNHCR and Bangladesh. However, he failed to describe how Bangladesh will tackle security issues due to acceptance of Rohingyas.

International Relations analyst, Professor Imtiaz Ahamed, identified four dimensions of security threat caused by Rohingyas (Ahamed, 2010):

1. Politico-Military Dimension of Security
2. Economic Dimension of Security
3. Social Dimension of Security and
4. Environmental Dimension of Security

The main problem of the previous studies is that they did not deal with Bangladesh's position with regards to 1951 International Refugee Convention, and the 1967 Protocol.

Other main point that is absent is the security implications for Bangladesh if it denies or accepts large numbers of Rohingya refugees.

Bangladesh's Legal Position

Bangladesh has been hosting thousands of Rohingyas. Refugees International estimates that 29,000 Rohingya live in official refugee camps in Bangladesh, while another 200,000 are in unofficial camps (Al Jazeera, 2016). In addition, to avoid repatriation, more than 20,000 refugees have disappeared (Al Jazeera, 2016). It is also likely that thousands more have blended in among the locals over many decades since Rohingyas started crossing into Bangladesh. Most of the Rohingyas live in southeastern coastal areas, near Cox's Bazar . Due to huge pressure of this ethnic group, Bangladesh is reluctant to take on any more refugees even though they continue to be subjected to violent oppression at the hand of government forces of Myanmar.

The Constitution of Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh, the supreme law of the land, has not covered human rights adequately. These articles concerning human rights are not sophisticated enough to protect refugees. However, it has signed a number of major international instruments. The significant instruments are UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CEDAW, and CAT (Srabani, 2012). As a result, Bangladesh shows humanitarian duty of care towards Rohingyas. This is done by Bangladesh without diplomatic cooperation from Myanmar. There are many security factors that are negatively impacted because of acceptance of huge numbers of Rohingyas. Bangladesh must pay attention to security considerations for its own citizens. Bangladesh is not a signatory party of 1951 Refugee Convention, or the 1967 Protocol. So it has to be tactful about following 1951 and 1967 conventions due to its own security needs.

Factors for not Accepting Rohingyas

On June 2012, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Dipu Moni, expressed her strong position towards the Rohingya situation. She said, "Bangladesh is a densely populated country and the Rohingyas have seriously impacted on our society, law and order, and environment. Considering all aspects, it will create serious problems for us" (The Daily Star, 2012). Additionally, "We are not interested in more people coming to Bangladesh" Bangladesh is a natural resource poor and densely populated country. It is overpopulated as is, and cannot absorb additional population from abroad.

Another vital point of concern is domestic and regional security. It is a security threat because hundreds of thousands of undocumented Rohingyas are living inside the country and they are not willing to repatriate (Sattar, 2016). This can lead to serious threats for Bangladesh in terms of internal security. These are further discussed below.

Ethnic Conflict and Rohingyas

Rohingyas are a Muslim ethnic group coming from Myanmar. They have taken shelter near Chittagong Hill Tracts areas. This area, on the other hand, consists of eleven ethnic groups, majority of them are non-Muslim. Bangladesh government always tries to keep a careful eye on this area so that peaceful multi-cultural harmony is maintained. Rohingyas, a foreign group encroaching in the area, may lead to 'Inter and Intra group' conflict that can trigger serious negative consequences to national and regional security and peace. Additionally, Rohingyas are stateless persecuted people who may see this area as a place for

permanent settlement. So they may try to acquire local people's lands and thus disrupt the current ethnic balance. It may lead to ethnic conflict and regional instability in Bangladesh.

Sources of Militancy

Chittagong hill tracks area is in a strategic zone in terms of international and national politics and its geographical location. Refugees from Myanmar can be major security threat for Bangladesh considering their potential militancy involvement. There are several armed Rohingya militant groups including The Arakan Rohingya Front (ARIF); Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO); Rohingya National Alliance (RNA); and Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) (Chakma, 2016). They can collaborate with Bangladeshi militant groups including the new JMB, The Harkat Ul Islami Bangladesh, and other militant groups.

Rohingyas are possibly involved with and may be receiving assistance from different Middle-East and Pakistani based groups. Indian Home Secretary Anil Goswami, in the Indo- Bangladesh home secretary level talks held in July 2013, expressed tension over militant training camps of the RSO operating inside the CHT (Chittagong Hill Track) with the assistance of foreign and local terrorist groups, like the Pakistan-based Lashker-e- Taiba and JMB . Militant activity could be the main reason for not accommodating Rohingyas in Bangladesh.

Cox's Bazar Can Become a Criminal Zone

Protection of local people can be another reason to refuse accommodating the Rohingyas. Most of Rohingyas have taken shelter in or near Cox's Bazar district of Bangladesh. Many undocumented refugees are living there. They have not been very cooperative with regard to the census . Some are committing crimes and engaging in illegal activities (The Daily Star, 2012). On 1 October, 2012 former Home Minister of Bangladesh, Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir accused the Rohingyas of involvement in a series of attacks on the minority Buddhist temples and homes in Ramu (Yeasmin, 2016).

Human Trafficking and Drug Smuggling

Rohingyas are the easy prey for human trafficking. On the other hand, many, if not most of the human traffickers are Rohingyas themselves (Yeasmin, 2016). According to many daily newspaper reports, human traffickers visit Rohingya camps regularly and persuade many for illegal migration (Marshall & Thepgumpanat, 2014). Human traffickers from Myanmar, collaborating with Bangladeshi human traffickers, discovered routes for bringing people from Bangladesh to Malaysia through the Bay of Bengal (Yeasmin, 2016).

Additionally, Teknaf, on the southern end of Cox's Bazar district, has become one of the lucrative places for drugs smugglers. Daily newspapers of Bangladesh report that Rohingyas are frequently arrested by BGB (Border Guard of Bangladesh) for carrying the illegal narcotic Yaba (Yeasmin, 2016). Bangladesh is forced to deploy more and more security forces in the area, which costs the government a lot of money. This diverts funds badly needed in economic development sectors.

Image is being Tarnished Abroad

Bangladesh accepted over a half million persecuted Rohingyas from Myanmar on an emergency basis on humanitarian ground. Regrettably, some of them are involving themselves with various criminal activities .

Some have already committed illegal activities such as obtaining fraudulent passports and identity cards for going abroad. A large segment of these migrants went to Middle- East, and some committed criminal activities (The Daily Star, 2015). Some went illegally and tried to identify as Bangladeshi citizens. Many Rohingyas were caught by several countries including Saudi Arabia for their involvement in criminal activities (Kabir, 2016). According a daily newspaper of Bangladesh, "The intrusion of Rohingyas from Myanmar and their overseas travel on fake Bangladeshi passports are big headaches for the authorities. Once abroad, they commit different kinds of crime, thus tarnishing the image of Bangladesh. The problem has been unchallenged for long" .


Labor Swap

The Rohingyas, who are deprived from citizenship rights, try to survive at any cost. They are working for extremely low wages. It is observed that local laborers of Cox's Bazar are being substituted by Rohingyas as they claim low remunerations compared to Bangladeshis. Many of them are employed in local hotels, motels, restaurants in the tourist town of Cox's Bazar (Imran & Mian, 2014). As a result, local Bangladeshi people have been losing their jobs. It is another serious threat for the local people in terms of their livelihood. Locals are now jobless and trying to leave their hometown for higher wages in other cities or abroad.

Economic Growth may be Affected

Economic growth can be hampered from the pressure of the huge refugee influx from Myanmar. Bangladesh is an overpopulated country with a fragile economy. Its natural resources are very limited compared to its population. Unemployment rate is high. On the other hand, the majority of the Rohingyas who have gotten shelter on humanitarian grounds are outside of development activities. Moreover, they do not have any legal rights to work. Keeping major parts of a population group outside of development activities cannot be economically beneficial for the country, nor is it likely to foster a peaceful future for Bangladesh. Figure-1 can illustrate the probable outcome of the situation better.

Figure-1: Possible Negative Impacts of Rohingyas in Bangladesh



Source: Developed by author

Environmental Degradation

Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar and Chittagong Hill tracks region shares 314.40 km(s) border with Myanmar. This region has significant environmental value as it contains the last remaining forested areas of the country (besides the Sundarbans). It is a vital area for maintaining ecological balance and biodiversity in the country. Over a half million refugees have taken shelter in Cox's Bazar. Coxes' Bazar has lost many parts of its forested reserve lands to provide shelter to these refugees. This has already caused serious damage to ecology, flora and fauna. Furthermore, Rohingyas illegally cut valuable trees to build shelter as well for managing their livelihood.

Keeping all these environmental security threats in mind, it may not be wise to keep over a half million refugees from Myanmar in this ecologically sensitive area, let alone accept new refugees. Moreover, Rohingyas have a high population growth rate (Al Jazeera, 2016), which will only increase environmental degradation.

A Stand against Injustice

Rohingyas are severely mistreated by their own government. According to the United Nations, "Widespread and ongoing violations against Myanmar's Muslim Rohingya minority, including denial of citizenship, forced labour and sexual violence, could amount to "crimes against humanity" .

It is high time for Bangladesh to take a firm stand against torture and injustice that is inflicted on the Rohingyas. Bangladesh needs to focus on the return of Rohingya's to Myanmar and their government granting citizenship rights to the persecuted Rohingyas.

Probable Way-Out

Against its own national interests, Bangladesh has been forced to accept a huge population group from Myanmar. Bangladesh's economic, environmental and security interests are being adversely affected. The country needs to find a way out of this situation.

There are many international legal authorities, conventions, charters, and laws for the protection of global refugees. The Conventions are sometimes inadequate to address "new" refugees from ethnic violence and gender- based persecution (Goodwin-Gill, 2016). Probable solution could be good negotiations under supervision of international advisory bodies. Bangladesh needs to get international attention and support for the return of refugees and ending the persecution of the Rohingyas in Myanmar.

As previously stated, Bangladesh needs to focus on a long-term solution that sees the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, and at the same time, their government granting citizenship rights to the persecuted Rohingyas so that the periodic large influx of refugees stops. However, solution will be difficult, if Myanmar remains uncooperative. Bangladesh has been negotiating with Myanmar for 38 years without fruitful solutions (Imran, and Mian, 2014). If bilateral diplomacy remains unproductive, then Bangladesh has to convince the international community to put pressure on Myanmar to resolve the Rohingyas issue. It can work with regional and international organizations to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar. Economic sanctions finally ended apartheid in South Africa. A similar effort may be necessary in this case.

Concluding Remarks

Bangladesh and Myanmar are neighbors sharing land and maritime boundaries. The two countries also have a long history of traditional and cultural ties (Uddin, 2014). In spite of having reasonably good diplomatic relationships, the two countries have not been able to find a long-term solution to the Rohingya issue.

Although Bangladesh has no obligations towards refugee protection laws as it is not a party of 1951 International Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, Bangladesh gave shelter to refugees coming from Myanmar in 1978, 1991, and 2012 due to humanitarian considerations. However, the burden of over a half of million refugees is creating many types of problems for the country. They are taking jobs from local workers by agreeing to work for lower wages. National forest reserves and ecologically sensitive areas are threatened. Some are engaging themselves with illegal activities, from obtaining fake passports to drug smuggling and human trafficking. Image of Bangladesh is being tarnished when Rohingyas with fake Bangladeshi passports commit crimes abroad. Further security concerns include collusion with international militancy groups and establishing armed militancy inside Bangladesh.

Bangladesh should not accept any more refugees as problems would intensify with greater numbers. Bangladesh has already massive population pressure and high population growth rate. In addition, it is time for Bangladesh to improve domestic laws for the protection of its citizens and tackle future security issues that can arise due to the refugee crisis.

If bilateral negotiations fail to produce a solution, then Bangladesh should be prepared to seek help from the international community. It may seek to work with regional and international organizations to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar so that the Myanmar government is forced to take back the refugees and stop its persecution of the Rohingya.

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২. প্রবন্ধ সর্বোচ্চ ছয় হাজার শব্দের মধ্যে সীমাবদ্ধ থাকতে হবে।
৩. প্রবন্ধ অন্য কোথাও (জার্নাল, সংবাদপত্র, ইত্যাদি) প্রকাশিত হয়নি বা প্রকাশের জন্য প্রেরিত হয়নি-এ মর্মে লেখককে প্রবন্ধ জমা দেওয়ার সময় একটি লিখিত বিবৃতি প্রদান করতে হবে।
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<http://www.uwp.edu/departments/library/guides/apa.htm> or <http://www.apastyle.org/>
৮. উদ্ধৃতির ক্ষেত্রে মূল বানানের কোনো পরিবর্তন হবে না। টীকা ও বক্তব্যের উৎস স্বতন্ত্রভাবে উল্লেখ করতে হবে। টীকার ক্ষেত্রে শব্দের উপর সুপার স্ক্রীপ্ট (যেমন)...আছে^১) সংখ্যা ব্যবহার করতে হবে এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট পৃষ্ঠার শেষে ফুটনোটে টীকা উপস্থাপন করতে হবে।
৯. Reference List প্রবন্ধের শেষে বর্ণানুক্রমিকভাবে উপস্থাপন করতে হবে। রেফারেন্স তালিকা যদি বাংলা ও ইংরেজি উভয় ভাষায় থাকে তবে প্রবন্ধটি যে ভাষায় লিখিত সে ভাষার রেফারেন্স তালিকা প্রথমে দিতে হবে। শুধুমাত্র ওয়েবসাইট রেফারেন্স তালিকা পৃথকভাবে বর্ণানুক্রমিকভাবে উপস্থাপন করতে হবে।
১০. প্রাপ্ত প্রবন্ধ প্রকাশ ও অন্যান্য ক্ষেত্রে এডিটোরিয়াল বোর্ডের সিদ্ধান্ত চূড়ান্ত বলে বিবেচিত হবে এবং মনোনীত/অমনোনীত কোন পাণ্ডুলিপি ফেরত দেওয়া হবে না।