

Bangladesh-China Contemporary Relations: Rohingya Refugee Crisis and its Impact

Mobarak Hossain* Md Nadim Aktar**

Abstract: Bilateral relations, particularly economic and trade-related cooperation; connectivity and infrastructural development between Bangladesh and China are on the rise as two states elevated their relations ‘comprehensive partnership of cooperation’ to ‘strategic partnership of cooperation’. As Bangladesh and China are enjoying the best time in their relations, the Rohingya refugee crisis has come as a sensitive issue for both the countries. As are liable neighbor Myanmar holds a huge stake for China and bears huge implications for its economy as well as its strategic ambitions in Asia and Pacific. Bangladesh - China's third-largest trading partner in South Asia is not less important in this case. In this concurrent spectrum, Bangladesh chooses China as an intermediary between Bangladesh and Myanmar and hopes to find a sustainable solution for Rohingya refugees crisis. This paper aims to examine China's role in resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis and its impact on the bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China.

Keywords: Bangladesh-China relations, win-win situation, Rohingya refugee crisis, China's response.

Introduction

Bangladesh-China relations have never been setback since the beginning of the journey in 1976. Bangladesh as a developing country from south Asia always seeks to maintain a strong partnership with China which perceived in the same way by the Peoples Republic of China. Bangladesh-China relations dominated by the Win-Win principle where Bangladesh hopes to turn itself a middle-income country within 2021 and China seeks to maintain its economic hegemony to feed its global aspirations. The recent relations between these two countries have been triggered by tremendous hope and aspirations where Bangladesh is one of regional partners of China's mega-project One Belt One Road (OBOR). Besides that, cooperation between the two countries in trade, infrastructure, information technology, energy, maritime transportation, communications, and transportation has been expanding in recent years. The scenario became more apparent after the historic visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping who declared a handsome amount of money to fuel several projects and signed several Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) over several development schemes. In this situation, Bangladesh- Myanmar tensions over the

* Assistant. Prof. Department. of Islamic Studies, Jagannath University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

** PhD, Fellow, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Rohingya refugee crisis have created a new dimension, where Chinese engagement has changed some previous understanding and created a new room for analyzing Bangladesh-China relations.

Research Methodology

This paper is conducting a qualitative study covering documentaries, library and Internet resources, as well as official documents of the United Nation High Commissioner of Refugee and editorial opinion of daily newspaper and different news sources. Since the qualitative approach tries to explore and discover development, clarify and explain relationships, and build results that are applicable beyond the immediate limits of research, this paper emphasized on determining the result from historical, political, economic point of view. Moreover, based on the literature and documents collected from the Ministry of Finance, the Bangladesh People's Republic, the Bureau of Statistics Management, the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Investment Board, and the Bangladesh Bank. All data and information collected from primary and secondary sources have been organized, reviewed, studied and interpreted, taking into account the basic interest of the study-Bangladesh-China's recent development of relations and impact of The Rohingya refugee crisis on this.

Objective of the Studies

The main objective of this study is to explore the nature, objectives and achievements of the bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China from the beginning of the 21st century to the last stage, when Bangladesh became an important source of China's growing market economy. This study moreover attempts to analysis the relations taking the Rohingya refugee issue under consideration. China's role as well as its approach towards solving Rohingya crisis is duly taken to draw the analytical framework of the study. Thus, this paper aims to illustrate the whole picture of China Bangladesh bilateral relations through the lens of Rohingya refugee crisis.

Significance of the studies

In recent times, Bangladesh-China relations particularly economic relations have expanded a lot. Because of the strengthening of economic cooperation, economic relations with a number of potential sectors have been studied through which relations between the two countries can be better understood. As Bilateral relations have been flourishing, Rohingya refugee crisis has come as an important factor to revisit the relation once again to get better apprehension about the contemporary state of relations between two rapidly increasing economies. However, there is some academic work that has been found on relations between Bangladesh and China, but no research has been carried out on the current state of relations between Bangladesh and China and the impact of the Rohingya refugee crisis on them, the study will be able to bridge the gap in literature.

Bangladesh-China relations: a brief overview

Although Bangladesh-China relations began after Bangladesh's independence, its root dates back a long time. At the time, both former Chinese and Bangladeshi leaders had a relationship. Pakistan's Bangladeshi leaders, Mohammad Ali Bogra and

Hussein Shahid Suhraordi, have good relations with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The founder president of Awami League and later on of National Awami Party Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Vashani also maintained a close relationship with the Chinese communist party.

¹This has been so important that even Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation, is believed to have sent a secret mission to China when he was at the head of the Bangladesh government, led by the AL during 1972-75.²After the liberation war, China formally recognized on October 4, 1975. Soon after China's recognition, Bangladesh sought to strengthen its ties with China. According to Sreeradha Datta, "China's determination to strictly adhere to interference in Bangladesh's internal affairs has led to bipartisan support for a closer relationship with Beijing." Bangladesh has significantly strengthened these relations through various economic agreements, trade policies and joint economic commissions, and the gradual expansion of cooperative fields. Since then, the Bangladesh-China relationship has grown thoroughly and smoothly.³

High-level visits between both countries are a common practice where Xi Jinping's visit in 2016 and Sheikh Hasina's visit in July 2019 regarded as landmark for both countries which best visualize the level of understanding and cooperation between the two nations. From a diplomatic point of view, these two visits play an important role in exchanging views on issues of common concern and have great potential for strengthening bilateral relations and creating new opportunities for mutual benefit and win-win results. After 30 years a Chinese president's visit to Dhaka was a milestone that attracted a great deal of attention by the media of both countries. Every Bangladeshi print and electronic media covered the news with great enthusiasm and excitement. In this state visit Bangladesh received a total sum of USD 24.4 Billion or 34 projects and programs further USD 13.16 Billion as Chinese investment on 13 joint ventures. Recently Bangladesh-China relations got noteworthy progress after the visit of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to 1 to 5 July 2019. After the historic state visit of Xi Jinping in 2016 this visit of PM Hasina attracted great attention and bears a huge implication for both countries. A number of bilateral agreements in areas including aid or Rohingyas, economic and technical cooperation investment power culture and tourism.⁴The agreements signed between them are: framework agreement on the extension and strengthening of the energy system under the Dhaka Power Distribution Company (DPDC) Area project; concession contract for the extension of the electricity grid under the DPDC Area project; framework agreement on the project to strengthen the electricity grid; Agreement on technical and economic cooperation; Agreement on the establishment of an Investment Cooperation Working Group; Mou and her implementation plan for the hydrology information exchange on the Yalu Zhangbo/Brahmaputra River; MOU on cultural exchange and tourism programme. The two countries also agreed that China would provide 2,500 tons of rice to the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Bangladesh-China relations can be seen in several aspects.

Economic relations

Bangladesh-China's overall relations are predominated by economic relations cooperation and collaboration. Economic cooperation and collaboration between

Bangladesh and China have multiplied since the beginning of the 20th century. With common economic goals and fastest-growing GDP two countries trade relation is growing rapidly; where China aims to continue its economic superiority and Bangladesh hopes to alleviate its position from lower-income country to a middle-income country. Bangladesh is now China's third-largest trading partner in South Asia. China has overtaken India and USA in export-oriented trade with Bangladesh. In the last five years, trade between Bangladesh and China has increased by 64 percent while with India 28 percent and with the USA just 15 percent. Five years ago, in the 2012-'13 fiscal year, while Bangladesh's total trade with China was US\$ 6.78 billion, in 2016-'17 fiscal year, it has increased to US\$ 11.14 billion So, it has increased by about US\$ 4 billion which means both exports and imports have increased. In Fiscal Year 2016-17, Bangladesh's total import was around US\$ 48.21 billion while export was around US\$ 34.85 billion. China accounts for a big portion of this total export and import of Bangladesh. Currently, it is the largest exporter to Bangladesh.⁵A concern in Bangladesh-China economic relations is the trade imbalance, as exports to China are relatively less than imports from China. In fiscal 2015, China's imports to Bangladesh totaled \$13.9 billion, while Bangladesh's total exports to China amounted to \$840 million.⁶ Moreover the feasibility of establishing a china-Bangladesh free trade area can be illustrated, while China's support for new industrial zones in the country. The joint unveiling, inauguration, and laying of the foundation stone of projects such as the multi-lane Karnaphuli River Tunnel in Chittagong, the Shah Jalal Fertilizer Company in Sylhet and several thermal power plants dominated the Chinese president's visit.⁷

It has been projected that the two-way trade between Bangladesh and China will surpass 30 billion USD by 2021. Since 2011, imports from China have grown by about 20 percent and exports from Bangladesh by 40 percent. China has eliminated tariff barriers to 84 types of imported goods under the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). However, while China has granted Dhaka duty-free access to multiple goods, Bangladesh's exports to the country have not exceeded even US\$1 billion.⁸It has also invested heavily in infrastructure development, mainly in transportation and communications. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a China-led initiative approved loans of USD 165 million for infrastructure projects to Bangladesh panned or in the construction phase. The major achievement of the last decade in the cooperative behavior of two states is collaborative and joint venture projects in infrastructure sector. Until the last quarter of 2016, several infrastructures and technical Projects were initiated by the countries with the help of loans pumped by Chinese companies.⁹In June 2016 Asian Development Bank (ADB) had provided worth 165 million to Dhaka for a power distribution system upgrade and expansion program. On March 28, 2017, The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provided a loan of \$60 million to address Bangladesh's energy deficit and enhance natural gas production. As Bangladesh is a disaster-prone region, China has added another 83 million USD for Disaster Emergency Operation Centre and Information Platform. In addition, the much-anticipated the Padma railway bridge connects from Dhaka to Jessore, a project with 4.4 billion USD developed by China Construction Railway Co., Ltd. (CRCC). Railway connection project includes the construction of 66 main bridges, 244 small bridges, 14 new stations, and 100 trains.¹⁰

Strategic relations

Bangladesh- China perceives win-win strategic calculations in its strategic move on. Both the countries feel the necessity of maintaining close relationships to overcome its geopolitical vulnerability and security questions. The geopolitical reality of Bangladesh is: it has been surrounded three sides by India where India's territorial superiority is overwhelming. India, with its giant diamond shape, "Form a compact landmass in the [South Asia] center, and other nations of [the region] are in the ocean with unfavorable shapes and borders, widely separated from each other by the greater part of India but contiguous with all of them"¹¹ which creates stress in the strategic thinking of Bangladesh. Secondly Bangladesh shares Common River and big borders both inland and sea. Bangladesh-India stuck with many bilateral problems include common resource sharing and some issues like Border killing, encroachment of border by entering Bangladeshi water, setting dams and bridges unlitary. India's unwillingness and upper hand approach to resolve these bilateral problems fuel anti-Indian stance among people which perceives as direct threat to Bangladeshi interest by the policymaker. This vulnerability seeks Bangladesh to keep good strategic relations with China- a big power and potential rival of India.

With growing economic demands China looks forward to bolstering its presence in global waters by launching a policy of seeking naval facilities and strategic partnerships with the littoral states. In this mounting effort to strengthen its maritime capability and stimulate its maritime diplomacy, Indian Ocean is one of China's top priorities.¹² But China faces deep strategic imperatives in Indian Ocean which is not only difficult to overcome, but also have significant cost for China to confront India on one side and the US in another. China's first strategic vulnerability is grounded in its geographic location. China is not a coastal state of Indian Ocean, and moreover the ocean is an enclosed water body with some major entry points and vast distances between. Geopolitical vulnerability reinforced by the absence of direct overland transport between China and Indian Ocean. At the same time, in southern corner of Eurasian continent China faces a natural barricade where the mountain ranges, deserts and jungles make it difficult to have direct crossroad connection.¹³ Secondly, in the Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs) across the Indian Ocean particularly the transport of energy from the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of Persian Gulf, around the Subcontinent into the Bay of Bengal through the straits of Malacca, China holds huge stake and has been putting much attention to address this vulnerability.¹⁴ The most vulnerable point in this regard is the Strait of Malacca from where almost 80 percent of its oil imports pass. Bangladesh - located on the Bay of Bengal, the northern part of the Indian Ocean looks attractive to the Mahanian Chinese model of maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean.¹⁵ Thus, Bangladesh has huge implications for China to get access to Northern part of Indian Ocean. Deep seaport in Bangladeshi island or coastal region would bring huge leverage for China. This opportunity would help China to overcome Malacca dilemma, on one hand, on the other hand it will help China to keep active eye on India's naval installations and naval movement in Bay of Bengal.

Defense and Military Cooperation

Senior Colonel Zhang Wei, Military, Naval and Air Attaché at the Chinese embassy in Bangladesh, highlighted the "steady and rapid progress" in Sino-Bangladesh

military cooperation in the last few years, pointing to the frequent high-level visits, continuously “deepening pragmatic cooperation and fruitful cooperation in personnel training”.¹⁶ The Chinese naval task force has visited Chittagong for the second time in the past two years, which has played a positive role in promoting mutual trust and understanding, deepening exchanges and cooperation, improving the ability to jointly respond to maritime threats and protect regional stability. “At the same time, an increasing number of Bangladeshi officers have gone to China for training and exchange, which plays an important role in promoting mutual understanding and trust.”¹⁷

Moreover, Bangladesh is the second-largest importer of Chinese weapons after Pakistan. On November 14, 2016, the Bangladesh Navy acquires two 0356 type Diesel-Electric Submarines (SSK, Hunter-Killer Submarine), priced at \$203 million from China. The acquisition is located in Sheikh Hasina's concerns about the development of (air, surface and sub-surface) of the country's defense forces.¹⁸ This naval equipment has huge implications and interconnection with the security aspect of Bangladesh maritime sector. As Bangladesh gains sovereignty over a large portion of its sea by the verdict of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Permanent Court of Arbitration this acquisition will protect the interest of Bangladesh in Bay of Bengal. Since 2004, China provided 78 percent of Bangladesh's defense purchases.

Rohingya refugee crisis and china's response in the initial stage

It's been nearly two years since more than seven lakh Rohingya people have entered Bangladesh having fled violent crackdown in Myanmar. There's no viable solution in sight. Since 25 August 2017, when the latest Rohingya refugee influx from Myanmar to Bangladesh began, the numbers have steadily grown with the passage of time, where United Nations (UN) contemplates it as the world 's fastest-growing refugee crisis. Which also condemned by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”¹⁹ According to the UNHCR more than 723,000 seek refuge in Bangladesh. Most of them arrived in the first three months of their crisis.²⁰ The 12,000 arrived in Bangladesh during the first half of 2018. The vast majority of those arriving in Bangladesh are women and children, and more than 40 percent are under the age of 12. However, the horrific violence has unleashed on Rohingya civilians, including women and children. As of March over 909,000 stateless Rohingya refugees reside in Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas of Cox'sbazar. The vast majority live in 34 highly overcrowded camps, including the largest single-site, the Balukhali expansion site, which hosts some 626,500 Rohingya refugees.²¹

Primarily, the public statement of China was in favor of Myanmar which expresses fears of terrorism in Rakhine. In September 2017 Chinese Ambassador in Myanmar Hong Liang “strongly” welcomed the counter-attacks by Myanmar security forces against extremist terrorists and described his military campaign as “just an internal issue.”²² China would stand firmly by Myanmar affirmed by Hong Liang the Chinese Ambassador in Myanmar at a reception to mark 68th Anniversary of Peoples Republic of China. He stated that “We hope that the international community will create a good external environment so that Myanmar can solve its problems

properly”²³ later on China pour cold water in attempt of United Nations Security Council punitive measures to Myanmar. At the same time China had responded amicably on humanitarian ground by sending aid and assistance to Bangladesh or supporting the basic needs of Rohingya refugees.

This role has been justified by China on the ground of its one of very fundamental foreign policy principle non-interference in a country’s internal matter. Analysts have vowed different assumptions on China’s role in Rohingya refugee crisis which reflects different hypotheses mostly focuses on China’s geopolitical equation to beat India in the midst of the competition of taking driving seats in South Asia as well as the Indo-pacific region. Adrienne Joy gives three reasons which provoke China back Myanmar; the first is ideological second pragmatic benefits and a potential opportunity to improve its strategic relations, third is flexibility.²⁴ From the ideological point of view China never accepts interference in any of its internal matter or support to interfere with others. This principle is one of the basic component its historic five-point (Panchashila) by which its foreign relations dealt with its neighbors and other states. As Rohingya issue is an internal matter of Myanmar thus International community shouldn’t interfere in the manner poses threat to its sovereignty. Global Times- a state-run English-language tabloid of China support this approach by condemning western country's response to this crisis and vowed to share Myanmar’s universal value.²⁵ Secondly, this crisis brings a chance for China to test its commitment to its one of traditional ally Myanmar. With huge economic gains and strategic benefits China aims to take the driving seat on economic and infrastructural sector of Myanmar. Thirdly, as western countries always vow in support protecting human rights and take responsibility under RtoP (Responsibility to Protect, R2P or RtoP) mechanism, the relations turn bad immediate after any violation of human rights. Thus western countries can do little in mitigating the crisis. China is flexible in this aspect, could take a big role in meditating between two parties or two states involved. Thus, China’s immediate response after the crackdown was equated and well calculated both for its own interest and for a sustainable solution to the problem.

China as a mediator

Before discussing the role of Chinese mediation in the Rohingya refugee crisis, the history of China's participation in international refugee protection should be discussed in a brief. China has shown an emerging interest in refugee issues in recent years. It is in China's interest to include China in the international refugee protection system and increase its participation in international cooperation in the protection of refugees.²⁶ Moreover, China was the first Asian state to become a party of 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol.²⁷ China settled more than 250,000 Vietnamese refugees locally from 1978 to 1982.²⁸ In the past 20 years, China has seen at least four mass flows of displaced peoples. The North Korean people are coming to China since the mid-1990s which still a concern for China. Besides this, the arrival of ethnic Kachin and Kokangs is normal scenery since 2011. Betts and Loescher thus noted although China has remained on the sidelines in developing global policies for refugees; it's one of the countries that are the most influential impact on the global refugee

system.²⁹ As the second-largest economy, a permanent member of UN Security Council and an Executive Member of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) China have come to the attention to solve global refugee problems where German Chancellor Angela Merkel asked China to assist in solving refugee crisis in Europe.³⁰ In addition, the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 2017

Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to spend a billion U.S. dollars on international Organizations for refugee projects in Asia and Africa. In 2017 and 2018, an unprecedented number of refugee aid projects in Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe through the United Nations Office Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Food Programme funded by China.³¹

China's conciliatory role in the Rohingya refugee crisis started after Beijing's proposal for three-step solution to address the problem which represents Beijing's major policy shift. On November 19, 2017 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that Beijing is mediating its "three-stage plan" to achieve a "final and fundamental solution during his visit to Bangladesh and Myanmar."³² The three points are first, ceasefire on the ground second, repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar and third, developed policies to stimulate long-term economic development in Rakhine State, home to most Rohingya. Taking this proposal under consideration immediately after the visit of Wang Yi Bangladesh and Myanmar announced a bilateral agreement on the repatriation of the refugees. Recently the second attempt of Rohingya repatriation has failed because of the unwillingness of Rohingya due to lack of safety and surety of fearless dignified life in Myanmar. The failure of the second attempt to repatriate refugees in August 2019 creates a huge uproar among people from the policy level to the grassroots, which put enormous pressure on the government. In finding a lasting solution to the crisis China's role come into question. After this failure Bangladesh, China and Myanmar agreed to form a "tripartite "joint working mechanism to evaluate the situation on the ground for Rohingya repatriation."³³ Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Li Jiming said recently that China stands ready to "mediate and promote" the Rohingya's return in an "active" way to help find a solution as soon as possible.³⁴ This step indicates that Bangladesh once again gives a significant preference to China's active role in finding a sustainable solution to the problem. On the other hand, China is taking this issue as a test to maintain a good face and set an example for its successful reconciliation.

Impact on Bilateral relations

Since China's role has changed from the past the bilateral relations between Bangladesh and China represent an interesting result. Relations between the two states have become stronger and more effective after the crisis. As long as Bangladesh depends on China and asks to take a major role in this issue, it provides China a lead role to this global problem as well as gets an opportunity to show its sphere of influence in South Asia and Southeast Asia. China took the role to meditate which China does rarely. Lili Songhas stipulated three reasons that were as China's strategic thinking to deepen involvement in Rohingya refugee issue.³⁵ First, China is

concerned about the stability of countries along the Belt and Road, especially as Chinese investment in Bangladesh increases. Second, China's increased participation is consistent with its perceived goal of being a provider of public services and solutions to global problems. Thirdly, the international community, in particular the European Commission, the European Union, Germany, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, have made an active effort to involve China in matters of refugee protection. Unless giving much effort into the internationalization of the issue why Bangladesh choose China as a mediator could better understand by analyzing rational reasons behind it. Bangladesh- a rapidly growing economy with huge Chinese investment in regional connectivity and infrastructural development seeks China's active role to consider its economic and strategic power to persuade Myanmar as two states maintain strong historical bonding and close partnership. The need for the Chinese role on the safety, security, and prosperity of the region is well calculated by Bangladesh which similarly perceived by China. China has changed its previous one-eyed approach to the problem through strong diplomatic initiatives proceed by Bangladesh. The mutual understanding of the graveness of the problem and looking for a sustainable solution to the problem laid the ground for a new wave of the bilateral relation with trust and reliability between Bangladesh and China. This retrospect could be better understood by the historical past of two countries. In the war of independence in 1971 China played a very negative role and worked against a newly born state by imposing its first Veto against the decision on accepting Bangladesh as a member of United Nations. After establishing diplomatic relations that role of China has changed radically with positive attitudes and friendly approach. This time, in the same way the negative role of China by imposing Veto in United Nations Security Council against the punitive measures against Myanmar was a shock for Bangladesh which later turn into positive attitude by taking the role of reconciliation. China's pragmatic thinking about the UN Security Council measures was later understandable in the way that China barred UN Security Council measures to help to solve the problem through bilateral dialogue. If any measures were taken by international community, it would ultimately hamper the repatriation process as well as the durable solution of the crisis. The western-style sanctions unlikely to work as Myanmar have alternative options like China. Sanction didn't work in the past which would not bring fruitful results in this respect now. Sticking this thinking Bangladesh prefers bilateral solutions with the reconciliation of China.

No doubt that the future prospects of repatriation will be a major determinant of the relation between two countries. The question of successful repatriation will be remaining as a catalyst for both countries to maintain trustworthy bilateral relations. After the failure of recent attempt to repatriate Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh has asked China to play an active role in exercising its influence to begin the repatriation process as soon as possible China gives very positive gesture in this regard by the Statement of President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to Beijing in the first week of July 2019.³⁶ President Xi Jinping said there must be a quick solution for the Rohingya so that the displaced can return home. "The two leaders agreed that the Rohingya crisis would have to be resolved quickly," he said. The Bangladeshi foreign minister said after a bilateral meeting between Sheikh Hasina and Xi Jinping that there is no difference in opinion.

In this visit several MOUs (Memorandum of Understandings) have been signed between two states including power, water resources, and culture and tourism sector. Thus, Bangladesh's relationship with China is in a new impetus in the midst of the pressing Rohingya refugee problem, which has already strengthened Bangladesh's reliability and confidence in China, opening up new horizons in bilateral relations between two countries.

India's role in resolving the refugee crisis

India's initial response was not different from China. Immediate after the crackdown loaded by the Myanmar army, India's Prime Minister in his state visit to Myanmar pledged support and contemplates the issue from the internal security and sovereignty approach. Although it has changed its approach later and sends aid for Refugee but as a close ally and friendly neighbor India's role was not justifiable by the policymaker and analyst. It has been noticed that the Modi government has taken new approach in shaping foreign relations with Bangladesh where NRC (The National Register of Citizens) become a new issue. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) politicians and policymakers are speaking roughly about the unauthorized immigrant from Bangladesh who would be kicked off from the country. The main opposition party of India said India should not be seen as "indifferent or partisan" and should play a constructive role in resolving the Rohingya refugee crisis, accusing Prime Minister Narendra Modi of "squandering" the goodwill relations generated by previous government.³⁷ Amid this situation Bangladesh feels less confidence to ask India to take initiatives to solve the refugee problem. The NRC and Teesta water sharing issue believed to create an embarrassment for Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to India in October 2019. This was reflected by her unwillingness to take welcome addresses by his party men. So, by taking this upper hand strategy to deal with its neighbor India lost its credibility to meditate on such a global problem. And this way China ultimately takes the role of submerging India to approach Myanmar for a peaceful solution to the problem.

Conclusion

Bangladesh and China share some common national characteristics. Bangladesh is a country with predominantly Bengali people with the Bengali language. With a huge workforce, hydrological power, and a rapidly growing economy moving forward to reach the goal of becoming a middle-income country. In the same way, China has a majority Han race with some minority populations where Mandarin is their only language. Holding huge labor force, China is also a hydrological power and fastest-growing economy. The homogeneity of this national element with the historical legacy of Chinese tourists makes the bilateral relations matured. Since the relationship between the two countries is well calculated and is determined by the Win-win principle, there is little chance of turning it into a negative line. Bangladesh - Bounded by three sides by India properly use its China card to take advantage of the best outputs and reduce its pressure or rely on one. China considered Bangladesh a strong partner in overcoming its vulnerability in the Indian Ocean and in reaching the South Asian region. The stunning development of relations in every sector from economy to strategy, from security to energy, is a clear scenario between the two

countries in the dawn of the twenty-first century. The problem of Rohingya refugees is a test in this relationship, where Bangladesh relying heavily on China and believing that the problem will be resolved through mounting pressure on Myanmar by China. Many analysts have pledged that the possibility of success of the mediation is less likely. It may seem less likely, but the important point here is China's approach to maintaining the stability of peace in this region. This outlook certainly has an impact on Myanmar's positions. When Us President Donald Trump backs down from dealing with global crises, China is doing its part to flourish its credibility. This stand by China is duly regarded by Bangladesh, and the relations between the two countries reach a new dimension that can be better understood by the recent visit of the Prime Minister of Bangladesh where China pledges conformation to solve the problem.

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